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Underinsured Motorist Coverage: Legislative Solutions
to Settlement Difficulties
The automobile accident is perhaps the most pervasive tragedy of the twen-
tieth century.1 Unfortunately, economic hardship often compounds the human
cost of an automobile accident. Although the presence of automobile insurance
has eased the economic burden caused by accidents, 2 many accident victims are
forced to do battle with one or more insurance companies to obtain compensa-
tion for their injuries.3 When an accident involves an underinsured motorist,
4
the problems associated with settlement are exacerbated by uncertainty regard-
ing the obligations of the parties involved. 5
In an effort to resolve settlement conflicts arising from accidents involving
underinsured motorist coverage, the North Carolina General Assembly recently
passed a statutory amendment clarifying the rights and duties of insureds and
insurers. 6 Among the problems addressed by the 1985 amendment are subroga-
tion, "stacking," 7 and the insurer's duty to defend. This Note explains the sig-
nificance of these problems, analyzes the solutions prescribed by the general
assembly, and discusses the potential problems still ahead both for insureds and
insurers.
Most states, including North Carolina, have long required all automobile
owners to carry a minimum amount of liability insurance.8 Nevertheless, every
1. Although the United States has the lowest motor vehicle fatality rate in the world, HIGH-
WAY USERS FEDERATION & AUToMoTIvE SAFETY FOUNDATION, THE SAFETY BELT PROPO-
NENT'S GUIDE 2 (1984) (available in the Library of the Highway Safety Research Center, University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) [hereinafter cited as PROPONENT'S GUIDE], 38,899 fatal accidents
occurred in 1982. UNITED STATES DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC
SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATISTICS AND ANALYSIS, FATAL AccI-
DENT REPORTING SYSTEM 1982, ii (n.d.) (available in the Library of the Highway Safety Research
Center, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill). Of the 56,190 vehicles involved in fatal acci-
dents, 33,955 were passenger cars. Id.
2. In most cases private insurance companies pay the cost of injuries and fatalities due to
motor vehicle accidents. These companies pass this cost on to their insureds in the form of increased
premiums. PROPONENT'S GUIDE, supra note I, at 35. The national expense of traffic accidents
exceeds $45 billion annually. Id
3. Gallagher & German, Resolution ofSettlement Conflicts.Among Insureds, Primary Insurers,
and Excess Insurers: Analysis of the Current State of the Law and Suggested Guidelines for the
Future, 61 NEB. L. RV. 284 (1982) (discussing conflicts in the area of liability coverage).
4. An "underinsured motorist" is the owner of "a highway vehicle with respect to... which,
the sum of the limits of liability under all bodily injury bonds and insurance policies applicable at the
time of the accident is less than the applicable limits of liability under the owner's policy." N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (Supp. 1985). An underinsured motorist, in other words, is a
tortfeasor who has less liability insurance coverage than his or her victim's underinsured motorist
coverage. Underinsurance only becomes significant when the victim's damages exceed the
tortfeasor's liability coverage.
5. See Note, No-Fault Insurance--Subrogation in Underinsured Motorist Settlement Proceed-
ings-Schmidt v. Clothier, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 585, 586 (1985) (discussing the uncertainty
of obligations in underinsurance subrogation).
6. Act of July 31, 1985, ch. 666, § 74, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 862, 862-64 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (Supp. 1985)).
7. See infra notes 46-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of "stacking."
8. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(3) (Supp. 1985) requires minimum coverage of "twenty-
five thousand dollars ($25,000) because of bodily injury to or death of one person in any one accident
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motorist still faces the possibility of being injured in an accident caused by an
uninsured driver. Consequently, most states require that all automobile liability
insurance policies contain uninsured motorist coverage.9 Since 196110 North
Carolina has required that all automobile insurance policies contain uninsured
motorist coverage unless such coverage is specifically rejected by the insured."
This coverage compensates the insured when the tortfeasor has no insurance or
when the tortfeasor's insurance company is bankrupt. 12
Until recently, most courts rejected the applicability of uninsured motorist
coverage when the tortfeasor had the minimum coverage required by law, even if
the injured motorist's damages exceeded the liability limit of the tortfeasor's au-
tomobile insurance policy.1 3 Thus, in many instances a person was better off as
the victim of an uninsured driver than a driver with only minimal coverage.
14
This situation became known as the "underinsurance loophole."' 5 In 1979 the
North Carolina General Assembly recognized the need to close this loophole
and amended the uninsured motorist statute to provide coverage for the under-
insured motorist. 16 By including the underinsured motorist in the statutory def-
inition of uninsured motorist, the general assembly sought to eliminate the
underinsurance loophole and to protect motorists from financial loss due to inju-
and subject to said limit for one person, fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) because of bodily injury to
or death of two or more persons in any one accident."
9. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(3) (Supp. 1985) (requiring automobile liability poli-
cies to provide coverage "for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to
recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles and hit-and-run motor vehi-
cles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom."). For other
examples of uninsured motorist coverage requirements, see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 3937.18(A)(1)
(Page Supp. 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 36, 3636(B) (West 1985).
10. Act of June 6, 1961, ch. 640, § 1(3), 1961 N.C. Sess. Laws 831, 832 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(3) (Supp. 1985)).
11. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(3) (Supp. 1985).
12. See id.; for the text of the statute, see supra note 8.
13. In 1979 the North Carolina Court of Appeals refused to allow an injured insured to recover
on his own uninsured motorist policy even though his damages exceeded the tortfeasor's liability
limit. Tucker v. Peerless Ins. Co., 41 N.C. App. 302, 254 S.E.2d 656 (1979). The court reasoned
that "[h]ad the legislature wished to make an underinsured motorist an exception to the general
definition [of an uninsured motorist], it could have done so easily." Id. at 303, 254 S.E.2d at 657.
14. For example, consider an injured insured with bodily injury limits of $50,000 per person
and an equal amount of uninsured motorist coverage. If the insured had been injured by a motorist
with no insurance, he or she could have recovered up to $50,000. But if the tortfeasor had had a
liability limit of $25,000, the injured insured, under pre-1979 law could have recovered no more than
$25,000. Thus, the uninsured motorist provision of the injured insured's policy would have been of
no value in this situation.
15. James v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 18 Ohio St. 3d 386, 389, 481 N.E.2d 272, 274 (1985).
16. The 1979 amendment provides in part:
an "uninsured motor vehicle," as described in subdivision (3) of this subsection, includes
an "underinsured highway vehicle," which means a highway vehicle with respect to the
ownership, maintenance, or use of which, the sum of the limits of liability under all bodily
injury liability bonds and insurance policies applicable at the time of the accident is less
than the applicable limits of liability under the owner's policy.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (Supp. 1985).
Many other states have "[engrafted] underinsured motorist coverage into ... [the existing defi-
nition of an] uninsured motorist." Phillips, Underinsured Motorist Coverage in Mississippi, 3 Miss.
C. L. REv. 65, 72 (1982) (comprehensive survey of development of underinsured motorist coverage);
see, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 5-6A.1 (West Supp. 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-5-301(B) (1984);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 58-11-9.4 (1985).
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ries caused by a tortfeasor having only the minimum liability insurance cover-
age. Underinsured motorist coverage provides the injured insured a second
source of recovery in the event the tortfeasor has insufficient liability coverage or
assets to compensate the victim fully.
Because the 1979 amendment, through a definitional change, encompassed
the underinsured motorist, the "established rules of construction for uninsured
motorist coverage [applied] also to underinsured motorist coverage." 17 The es-
tablished rules of construction for uninsured motorist coverage, however, were
inadequate to deal with the problems that soon surfaced with underinsured mo-
torist coverage. 18
In 1985 the North Carolina General Assembly amended the underinsured
motorist statute, prescribing solutions to certain problems that are not encoun-
tered with uninsured motorist insurance but that have plagued underinsured
motorist insurance since its inception. 19
I. DEFINING THE RIGHTS OF INSURER AND INSURED
Subrogation is a tool of equity that allows an insurer to "step into the shoes
of the party whom [it] has compensated and sue any party who the compensated
party could have sued."'20 Thus, in the event of an accident with an uninsured
tortfeasor, an injured party may receive compensation under his or her own
uninsured motorist policy. The uninsured motorist insurance carrier then is en-
titled to pursue the injured party's claim against the tortfeasor to the extent of
the payment made to its insured.
21
When an underinsured tortfeasor is involved, however, the process of sub-
rogation is complicated by the presence of a second insurance company-the
underinsured tortfeasor's liability insurer. Insurance carriers representing the
injured party and the tortfeasor have conflicting goals. The tortfeasor's liability
carrier seeks to fulfill its duty to "defend and indemnify" by paying the policy
limits and obtaining a release for its insured.2 2 The underinsurance carrier, on
the other hand, desires to preserve its subrogation rights. Because the release
the tortfeasor's liability carrier seeks would destroy the subrogation rights that
17. Phillips, supra note 16, at 76.
18. See generally Hentemann, Underinsured Motorist Coverage; A New Coverage With New
Problems, 1983 INs. CouNs. J. 365 (analyzing the problems arising from the competing interests of
the underinsurance carrier, the injured insured, and the tortfeasor's insurance carrier).
19. Act of July 31, 1985, ch. 666, § 74, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 862, 862-64 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (Supp. 1985)).
20. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1279 (5th ed. 1979).
21. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(3) (Supp. 1985) provides:
In the event of payment to any person under the coverage required by this section and
subject to the terms and conditions of such coverage, the insurer making such payment
shall, to the extent thereof, be entitled to the proceeds of any settlement for judgment
resulting from the exercise of any limits of recovery of such person against any person or
organization legally responsible for the bodily injury for which such payment is made,
including the proceeds recoverable from the assets of the insolvent insurer.
22. See Hentemann, supra note 18, at 371.
[Vol. 641410
INSURANCE LAW
the underinsurance carrier wishes to retain,23 the two carriers may find them-
selves at an impasse.
To protect their subrogation rights, insurers often include a "consent-to-
settlement" clause in their insurance policies.24 Such a clause requires the in-
sured to obtain consent from his or her insurer before executing a release of the
tortfeasor.25 The insured's failure to obtain consent for a release may relieve the
insurer of any obligation to pay on the underinsurance policy claim.26 The con-
sent-to-settlement clause also can impede the efficient processing of a policy-
holder's claim on his or her underinsured motorist coverage.
2 7
A tortfeasor's liability carrier may be willing to settle a claim by paying the
policy limits on the condition that its insured obtain a release from the injured
party. The underinsurance carrier, however, may oppose the settlement on the
ground that the release of the tortfeasor from further liability would destroy its
subrogation rights. This conflict presents a dilemma for the injured party. The
injured party cannot collect underinsured motorist benefits from its insurer
without first exhausting the tortfeasor's coverage2 8 and may be unable to settle
with the tortfeasor because the underinsurance carrier will not consent to the
destruction of its subrogation rights that would result from a release of the
tortfeasor's liability.
2 9
In some states the courts have taken the lead in attempting to resolve this
dilemma. 30 In Prudential Property and Casualty Co. v. Nayerahamadi3' a fed-
eral district court in Pennsylvania held that an insurance company could not
withhold its consent when a reasonable settlement was proposed.32 The prob-
23. See Doyle v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 546 F. Supp. 532 (E.D. La. 1982); Frey v. Indepen-
dence Fire and Casualty Co., 698 P.2d 17 (Okla. 1985).
24. See March v. Mountain States Mut. Casualty Co., 101 N.M. 689, 693, 687 P.2d 1040, 1044
(1984) (an insured's settlement with the tortfeasor's insurance company without the consent of the
underinsurance carrier was in violation of the consent-to-settlement provision of the policy and,
therefore, relieved the underinsurance carrier of its obligation to the insured).
25. See id. at 691, 687 P.2d at 1042.
26. Id.
27. See Note, supra note 5, at 595-96; see also Thomas, No-Consent-to-Settlement Clauses and
Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 35 FED'N. INS. COUNS. Q. 71, 71-76 (1984) (discussing consent-to-
settlement clauses in the context of uninsured motorist coverage).
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (Supp. 1985), provides:
Underinsured Motorist coverage shall be deemed to apply when, by reason of payments of
judgment or settlement, all liability bonds or insurance policies providing coverage for bod-
ily injury caused by the ownership, maintenance, or use of the underinsured highway vehi-
cle have been exhausted. Exhaustion of such liability coverage for purpose of any single
claim presented for underinsured motorist coverage shall be deemed to occur when either (a)
the limits of liability per claim have been paid upon such claim, or (b) by reason of multiple
claims, the aggregate per occurrence limit of liability has been paid. Underinsured motorist
coverage shall be deemed to apply to the first dollar of an underinsured motorist coverage
claim beyond amounts paid to the claimant pursuant to the exhausted liability policy. [em-
phasis added.]
29. See Hentemann, supra note 18, at 371.
30. See infra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
31. 593 F. Supp. 216 (E.D. Penn. 1984) (mem.).
32. Id. at 218 (citing 12A G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 45:645, at 187-88
(2d rev. ed. 1981)).
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lem with this solution is that it is likely to require a judicial determination of the
proposed settlement's reasonableness.
An alternate approach proposed by the Minnesota Supreme Court in
Schmidt v. Clothier33 establishes specific procedural guidelines for settlement
and subrogation. 34 The North Carolina General Assembly adopted this ap-
proach in the 1985 amendment to North Carolina General Statutes section 20-
279.21(b)(4). 3 5 Under this approach, an injured party first obtains a proposed
settlement from the tortfeasor's liability carrier. The injured party then submits
this proposal to the underinsurance carrier, which has thirty days to consider
the proposed settlement and can either substitute its own check in the amount of
the proposed settlement and preserve its subrogation rights, or allow the settle-
ment and release to take place and waive its subrogation rights.
36
This provision of the 1985 amendment has several desirable consequences
for both insurers and insureds.3 7 First, the adoption of a clearly defined settle-
ment and subrogation procedure lessens the likelihood of litigation. When the
parties involved are aware of their rights and obligations, there is less room for
disagreement and a diminished need for judicial intervention in the settlement
process. Second, the procedure shortens the delay in payment to the insured.
Because the procedure requires the underinsurance carrier to make payment or
allow a settlement within thirty days of receiving the tortfeasor's proposed set-
tlement, the insured will receive compensation without unreasonable delay.
Last, it gives the underinsurance carrier an opportunity to protect its subroga-
tion rights.
The amendment, however, does not resolve the problems caused by a re-
lease executed without the consent of the underinsurance carrier. This may oc-
cur when a policyholder releases the tortfeasor without first ascertaining
whether a claim may be filed under an underinsured motorist coverage provision
and later discovers that the settlement amount is insufficient to cover all the
damages. The injured party then may attempt to collect on the underinsured
motorist coverage. The generally accepted rule in this situation is that a release
executed without the insurer's consent relieves the insurer of its obligation to
33. 338 N.W.2d 256 (Minn. 1983).
34. Id. at 262-63.
35. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (Supp. 1985) which provides in part:
No insurer shall exercise any right of subrogation or any right to approve settlement with
the original owner, operator, or maintainer of the underinsured highway vehicle under a
policy providing coverage against an underinsured motorist where the insurer has been
provided with written notice in advance of a settlement between its insured and the under-
insured motorist and the insurer fails to advance a payment to the insured in an amount
equal to the tentative settlement within 30 days following receipt of such notice. Further,
the insurer shall have the right, at its election, to pursue its claim by assignment or subro-
gation in the name of the claimant, and the insurer shall not be denominated as a party in
its own name except upon its own election.
36. Id.
37. See Schmidt v. Clothier, 338 N.W. 2d 256, 260-61 (Minn.1983) (enumerating the problems
alleviated by the settlement procedure). The procedure adopted by the Minnesota Supreme Court,




pay.38 The insurer will be relieved of its obligation, however, only if it can show
that substantial prejudice to its rights under the policy resulted from the release.
The test for substantial prejudice focuses on the value of the subrogation right
lost as a result of the release.39 Prejudice may be found if the insurer shows that
it could have recovered a significant amount from the tortfeasor but for the set-
tlement. On the other hand, if the tortfeasor has no significant assets, a court
generally will not find substantial prejudice.40
This simple test ignores an important fact-when the insured releases the
tortfeasor without his or her insurer's consent, the underinsurance carrier is
thrust into an adversarial relationship with its own insured. Because the release
has destroyed any subrogation right that the insurer may have had and because
there is a likelihood of disagreement between insurer and insured regarding the
value of the lost subrogation right, it is likely that the insured will have to sue his
or her own underinsurance carrier to obtain payment on the underinsurance
policy. Two elements of prejudice to the insurer not presently recognized under
the substantial prejudice doctrine4 ' may arise in this situation. First, the insurer
is at a disadvantage in any suit brought by its own insured to determine whether
the lost subrogation right was of significant value. Juries rarely look with favor
on the "deep-pocket" carrier in an action brought by the already-victimized in-
sured.42 Juries may perceive the insurance carrier as a fat fish chasing after
"'mere flotsam and jetsam floating on the sea of economic irresponsibility'"
when the insurance carrier claims that the release of a particular underinsured
motorist caused it to suffer substantial prejudice. 43 Thus, an insurance carrier is
unlikely to be able to convince a jury that it has lost a valuable subrogation
right. Juries often think of a few thousand dollars as an insignificant loss to the
insurer, failing to realize the aggregate financial burden that many of these "in-
significant losses" may impose. Second, even if a carrier is successful in a suit
brought by its own insured, such suits are bad for business. An insurer with a
reputation for forcing its insureds into court to obtain payment is unlikely to
attract many new customers.
The settlement and subrogation procedure the general assembly adopted
eliminates many of the conflicts and uncertainties that have characterized unin-
sured and underinsured motorist coverage. Despite the 1985 amendment, how-
38. See 12A G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 45:645, at 186; (2d rev. ed. 1981);
see, eg., Nayerahamadi, 593 F. Supp. at 218; Frey v. Independence Fire & Casualty Co., 698 P.2d
17, 21 (Okla. 1985).
39. See Rampy v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 278 So. 2d 428, 433-34 (Miss. 1973) (hold-
ing that an insurer was not substantially prejudiced when the subrogation right applied to an indi-
gent motorist).
40. See. eg., Rampy v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 278 So. 2d 428, 433-34 (Miss. 1973).
41. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
42. This phenomenon has been referred to by practicioners as the "target defendant stigma."
Interview with Robert Gardner, Regional Claims Attorney for Nationwide Insurance Co. (Sept. 20,
1985); see also, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Galloway, 354 N.W.2d 527, 531 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984) (insured's settlement with joint tortfeasors for less than their policy limits did not bar insured's
claim for uninsured benefits).
43. Rampy v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 278 So. 2d 428, 433 (Miss. 1973) (quoting
Lovering v. Erie Indem. Co., 412 Pa. 551, 554, 195 A.2d 365, 367 (1963)).
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ever, it is still difficult to predict the effect of a release executed without the
underinsurance carrier's consent. The substantial prejudice doctrine often yields
a result consistent with the statute's purpose-to provide coverage for the in-
jured insured.44 In many instances, however, the insured recovers at the ex-
pense of the underinsurance carrier because he or she has impaired the right to
subrogation of the claim against the party primarily liable-the underinsured
tortfeasor.45 Because fault for this situation is properly attributable to the
wrongfully executed release, it is arguable that the insured should bear some of
the burden. When faced with the decision, however, a jury almost invariably
will decide for the victimized insured if the only alternative is to deny recovery
totally. Because the wrongful release situation is not addressed in the amend-
ment to the underinsured motorist statute, the North Carolina courts still shoul-
der the responsibility for its resolution. A properly executed release is vital to
the smooth functioning of the new statutory settlement procedure, and the
courts should reevaluate the substantial prejudice doctrine. To be effective, a
judicial rule for this situtation should weigh the competing policies of compen-
sating the injured insured and protecting the insurer from the financial burden of
the wrongfully executed release. The substantial prejudice doctrine ignores both
the potential for damage to the insurer's reputation that would arise from suing
its own insured and the financial burden of the judicially excused wrongful re-
lease. Therefore, it may be necessary for courts to allocate at least part of the
financial burden to the insured who has wrongfully released the tortfeasor.
II. STACKING COVERAGE LIMITS TO COMPENSATE THE INJURED INSURED
Stacking is the aggregation of insurance coverage limits when more than
one coverage applies; 46 it allows an insured to combine the coverage amounts of
all available policies "to create a larger pool from which the injured party may
draw in order to compensate him for his actual loss when a single policy is not
sufficient to make him whole." 47 Stacking may never be used to permit recovery
beyond the amount of the injured party's actual loss. 48 Although most insur-
ance policies contain an "other insurance" clause with which an insurer "at-
tempts to make its policy excess to all other available policies,"'49 North
Carolina does not allow such a clause to prevent recovery by an injured insured
44. See Moore v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 270 N.C. 532, 543, 155 S.E.2d 128, 136 (1967) ("[O]ur
statute is designed to protect the insured as to his actual loss .... ").
45. Although the fault for the loss of the subrogation right is attributable to the insured, it is
the "target defendant" insurer who usually pays the price. See supra note 42 and accompanying
text.
46. 12A G. COUCH, supra note 38, § 45:628, at 77.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 73.
49. See id. at 70. Many jurisdictions have declared these other insurance clauses to be invalid
in the uninsured or underinsured motorist context. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 271
So. 2d 457, 458 (Fla. 1972) (provision struck down on public policy grounds); Wood v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 234 Ga. App. 782, 785, 218 S.E.2d 65, 67 (1975) (declaring other insurance
clause void as conflicting with the policy behind the uninsured motorist statute).
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whose damages exceed the limits of other applicable policies.5 °
Several states have enacted "anti-stacking" statutes. 5 1 Such statutes are for
the most part a reaction to the abuses of stacking allowed by some courts.
5 2
Even in states that allow stacking an injured party may not recover more than
the actual loss.5 3 Generally, however, there is a trend toward a more permissive
use of stacking.
5 4
Two primary reasons exist for allowing an injured insured to stack cover-
ages when it is necessary to compensate the insured fully. First, stacking is har-
monious with the general purpose of North Carolina General Statutes section
20-279.21(b). In Moore v. Hartford Insurance Co.55 the North Carolina
Supreme Court enunciated the policy behind the statute:
Its purpose was to provide, within fixed limits, some financial recom-
pense to innocent persons who receive bodily injury or property dam-
age, and to the dependents of those who lose their lives through the
wrongful conduct of an uninsured motorist who cannot be made to
respond in damages. A compulsory motor vehicle insurance act is a
remedial statute and will be liberally construed so that the beneficial
purpose intended by its enactment by the General Assembly may be
accomplished.
56
Second, the insured has paid premiums for the additional policies with an expec-
tation that he or she will receive the benefit of the bargain-compensation for
losses suffered as a result of an injury caused by an underinsured motorist.
57
50. In Turner v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 11 N.C. App. 699, 182 S.E.2d 6 (1971), the court of
appeals held that:
the defendant cannot under the uninsured motorist provisions of its policy nor under its
"other insurance" clauses, deny coverage to plaintiff on the ground that the insured (plain-
tiff) had other similar insurance available to her and paid to her, plaintiff's judgment being
in excess of the uninsured motorist coverage available to her as such would be contrary to
the intent and provisions of [N.C. GEN. STAT. § ] 20-279.21.
Turner, 11 N.C. App. at 702-03, 182 S.E.2d at 8 (quoting the trial court's conclusions of law and
judgment).
51. See, eg., LA. REV. CODE § 22: 1406(D)(1)(c) (1981) (prohibiting stacking except for a
person "injured while occupying an automobile not owned by said injured party."). In any event,
stacking is limited to one additional policy.
52. Holmes v. Reliance Ins. Co., 359 So. 2d 1102 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 362 So. 2d 1120
(La. 1978) (allowing stacking of 160 policies).
53. 12A G. COUCH, supra note 38, § 45:628, at 77.
54. Id.
55. 270 N.C. 532, 155 S.E.2d 128 (1967).
56. Id. at 535, 155 S.E.2d at 130-31. The court in Moore also pointed out that it was "not
intended by the General Assembly that an insured shall receive more from such coverage than his
actual loss, although he is the beneficiary under multiple policies issued pursuant to the statute." Id.
at 543, 155 S.E.2d at 136.
57. The New Hampshire Supreme Court recognized the insured's right to expect the benefits of
stacking in Descoteaux v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 125 N.H. 38, 480 A.2d 14 (1984). The court noted
that " '[w]hen an insured purchases additional coverage he reasonably expects to be protected
against uninsured motorists up to the amount for which he paid. Since the legislature created an
option for additional coverage, it intended that those choosing to buy increased protection should
receive its benefits.'" Id. at 45, 480 A.2d at 19 (quoting Visneault v. Travelers Ins. Co., 118 N.H.
75, 80, 382 A.2d 910, 914 (1978)). The court noted further that the fact "'additional coverage is
provided by more than one policy, rather than through increased liability limits should not under-
mine that legislative decision.'" Descoteaux, 125 N.H. at 45, 480 A.2d at 19 (quoting
Courtemouche v Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co., 118 N.H. 168, 172, 385 A.2d 105, 107 (1978)).
1986] 1415
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Stacking enables the insured to receive this benefit.
The 1985 amendment to North Carolina General Statutes section 20-
279.21(b)(4) specifically addresses the question of stacking. 5 The amended stat-
ute permits stacking when two or more policies apply. It is unclear, however,
whether stacking is permitted when more than one vehicle is insured under a
single policy.5 9 Thus, if an insured has two vehicles insured under different pol-
icy instruments, the policy limits may be combined or stacked. If an insured has
two vehicles insured in the same policy instrument, however, only one coverage
limit may be available. These anamolous results would occur even though the
policy premiums would be the same in both cases.
The general assembly did not specifically address a situation in which a
policyholder has two separate policies on two different vehicles issued by the
same insurance carrier. Whether a policyholder would be able to stack the lia-
bility limits of the two policies to the extent of damages is unresolved. In
Descoteaux v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. 60 the New Hampshire Supreme
Court answered this question in the affirmative stating "[w]e hold that the in-
sured is entitled to stack the medical payments coverage of the two separate
policies in return for the premiums paid, regardless of whether the premiums are
paid to the same or different carriers."'6 1 That an insured pays a premium based
on the amount of exposure to which the insurance carrier obligates itself sup-
ports the result in Descoteaux. An insured paying two separate premiums does
so as consideration for the insurer's increased exposure and in expectation of
increased coverage.
62
The Connecticut Supreme Court in Dixon v. Empire Mutual Insurance
Co.63 used the same rationale to permit aggregation of coverage limits when a
second vehicle was added to a five-month-old policy. Because of the separate
listing and payment of a separate premium on the second vehicle, the court per-
mitted stacking of the policy limits on both vehicles.64 This argument logically
extends to all instances in which insurance companies charge separate premiums
for separate vehicles.
65
Two characteristics of the multivehicle policy, however, arguably support
denying a policyholder the right to stack the coverages for each vehicle. First,
58. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (Supp. 1985).
59. See id. The distinction made by the amendment can best be illustrated as follows. If the
insured has two cars and purchases a separate policy for each car, the insured can stack the underin-
sured motorist coverage on each vehicle. If, on the other hand, the insured has two cars and
purchases insurance for each car, but the insurance contracts are contained in one insurance agree-
ment, the insured may not be able to stack the underinsured coverage that he or she has paid for
each vehicle.
60. 125 N.H. 38, 480 A.2d 14 (1984).
61. Id. at 43, 480 A.2d at 18.
62. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
63. 189 Conn. 449, 456 A.2d 335 (1983).
64. Id. at 453, 456 A.2d at 336-37.
65. See Veal v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 39 Conn. Supp. 90, 469 A.2d 1234 (1983) (rule
permitting stacking of liability limits should be the same whether coverage on different policies is
contained in the same policy or on separate policies); accord Auto-Owners Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 10
Ohio St. 3d 156, 462 N.E.2d 396 (1984).
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many multivehicle policies list one premium amount even though that amount
usually represents the sum of the premiums for each vehicle. The argument
against stacking in this situation is that it appears to afford the benefit of two
separate policies for the price of one. When only one premium amount is paid it
is often assumed that the parties to the policy contemplated only one coverage
limit.66 Second, there is often a discount on multivehicle policies. The discount
supports the argument that the parties did not contemplate the same coverage
that would be afforded under separate, full-price policies.
In reality, the distinctions between multivehicle policies and separate poli-
cies are superficial. The existence of a single premium has little significance
when a policy lists two or more vehicles and provides for a premium equal to the
combined total of premiums charged for similar vehicles on separate policies.
From the insured's perspective, because premiums are based on the amount of
potential exposure, 67 it would be unjust to allow the insurer to charge for two
full premiums and then afford coverage for only one simply because both vehi-
cles are listed on the same policy. Similarly, the discounting of premiums for
vehicles subsequently added to a multivehicle policy does not reflect either the
insurer's expectation of decreased exposure or the insured's expectation of di-
minished coverage. 68 Rather, the discount reflects a savings in admininstrative
costs-usually only a matter of a few dollars-that the insurer passes on to the
insured.
69
The amended version of North Carolina General Statutes section
279.21(b)(4) allows stacking when "more than one policy may apply .... ,,70
Therefore, the statutory language appears to deny a policyholder the right to
stack coverage limits on a multivehicle policy. Restricting stacking based on the
single versus multivehicle policy distinction is too arbitrary. Neither logic nor
equity supports a denial of stacking on multivehicle policies, while permitting
stacking of policies that list only one vehicle. Furthermore, the public policy
underlying the statute-to compensate the innocent victim of an accident caused
by an unisured or underinsured motorist-is not served by such an arbitrary
restriction.
III. THE INSURER'S DUTY TO DEFEND
The standard motor vehicle insurance policy contains a clause obligating
66. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Piatt, 417 So. 2d 705 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (stacking not per-
mitted when insured had paid one premium for policy covering two vehicles).
67. The amount of potential exposure is the total amount for which the insurer could be liable
should all covered accidents occur.
68. See Lopez v. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co., 98 N.M. 166, 646 P.2d 1230 (1982) (stacking
held appropriate when insurance contract covered two automobiles with separate uninsured motorist
coverage and premium on second vehicle was reduced by one dollar).
69. Interview, supra note 42; see also Lopez v. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co., 98 N.M. 166, 172,
646 P.2d 1230, 1235 (1982) (suggesting that a small discount on the premium for a second vehicle in
a mulitvehicle liability policy reflects the decreased likelihood that both cars will be at risk at the
same time).
70. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 279.21(b)(4) (Supp. 1985).
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the insurer to defend in any action against the insured.71 The duty to defend is
the distinguishing characteristic between "indemnity" and "liability" insurance
policies. As Professor Couch has explained, "[liability insurance policies] pro-
tect the insured against liability although he has not actually paid the injured
person, and are thus distinguishable from an 'indemnity' policy which binds the
insurer to pay only after a final judgment against the insured has been paid."
72
The 1985 amendment to North Carolina General Statutes section 20-279.21
raises some questions regarding the nature of the duty to defend. This section
states:
[P]rovided that application is made to and approved by a presiding
superior court judge,.. . any insurer providing primary liability insur-
ance on the underinsured highway vehicle may upon payment of all of
its applicable limits of liability be released from further liability or obli-
gation to participate in the defense of such proceeding. However, prior
to approving any such application, the court shall be persuaded that
the owner ... of the underinsured highway vehicle... [has been given]
his right to select counsel of his own choice to appear in such action on
his separate behalf.
73
This provision allows a tortfeasor's insurance carrier to pay its liability limits
and thus relieve itself of its duty to defend.
Arguably, an insurer has always had the right to withdraw from a suit
against its insured once it has paid the liability limits of the policy. Under the
standard insuring agreement, the insurer provides that the "duty to settle or
defend ends when [the] limit of liability has been exhausted."' 74 In conjunction
with a policy provision that reserves to the insurer the right "to settle or defend
as we consider appropriate," the power to "pay in and get out" has always be-
longed to the insurer.75
Insurers often use the provision allowing for settlement or defense to avoid
a suit. Take, for example, a primary insurer (the tortfeasor's insurer) who be-
comes liable for damages negligently caused by its insured who has the mini-
mum 25,000 dollar policy limit. The injured party estimates damages to be
about 25,000 dollars. The primary insurer can pay its policy limit to the injured
party and avoid a suit as long as it obtains a release for its insured. Alterna-
tively, if the insurance company believes the claim for damages is specious or
exaggerated, it can defend its insured in court with the hope of paying out less in
final judgment than the 25,000 dollar settlement proposed by the injured party.
By litigating the issue of damages, however, the insurer assumes the risk of pay-
ing not only the full damages of 25,000 dollars but also of paying litigation
expenses.
71. Most insurance policies contain the following type of clause: "In addition to our limit of
liability, we will pay all defense costs we incur. Our duty to settle or defend ends when our limit of
liability for this coverage has been exhausted." State Farm Ins. Co., Automobile Insurance Policy
Form No. 98338.2 (including copyrighted material of N.C. Rate Bureau, 1980).
72. See 12 G. COUCH, supra note 38, § 45:17, at 247 (2d rev. ed. 1984).
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (Supp. 1985).
74. See supra note 71.
75. See supra note 71.
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On these facts, the amended version of North Carolina General Statute sec-
tion 20-279.21(b)(4) would allow the primary insurer to pay the 25,000 dollar
policy limit and be released from all further obligations.76 This result acts as an
inducement for the primary insurer to settle rather than litigate. Therefore, the
1985 amendment may reduce litigation and facilitate the prompt payment of
claims.
The cost of this decrease in litigation and increase in efficient claims
processing, however, will be paid by the insured. The liability contract, for
which the insured bargained, imposes a the duty on the insurance carrier to
defend the insured and pay the costs of defense.77 Under the 1985 amendment,
an insurer faced with the situation described above would opt for payment of the
policy limits. In fact, the insurer might pay the policy limits even if it believed it
could successfully defend or if it believed the claim to be exaggerated. 78 Because
a protracted defense of the insurer's insured could be quite expensive, it is likely
that many insurers will choose to pay the policy limits, forcing the insured to
hire separate counsel.
7 9
The statutory provision allowing an insurer to pay its policy limits and es-
cape responsibility for defending the insured enables one of the parties to the
insurance contract to repudiate part of its bargain. Part of the benefit of any
automobile liability insurance policy is that the insurer's obligations arise at the
moment a covered injury is sustained.80 The insurer's liability should extend to
the costs of a suit against the insured when so provided in the insurance
contract.
IV. CONCLUSION
The 1985 amendment of North Carolina General Statutes section 20-
270.21(b)(4) offers long overdue legislative guidance for settlement of underin-
sured motorist claims. The procedure for subrogation undoubtedly is the most
valuable contribution of the amendment. By clarifying the rights and obliga-
tions of both insurers and insureds, the amendment assures that victims of un-
derinsured tortfeasors no longer will have to wait for compensation because of
sparring between insurance companies.
The provision that restricts stacking by excluding coverage on multivehicle
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (Supp. 1985). See supra text accompanying note 73 for
the relevant language of the statute.
77. See Jamestown Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 277 N.C. 216, 176 S.E.2d 751
(1970) (insurance company held liable for costs of defense when insurer wrongfully refused to defend
its insured against claims arising out of a covered automobile accident).
78. An interesting situation arises when the underinsurance carrier believes that its insured is
exaggerating his or her damages. If the injured insured brings suit for payment on the underin-
surance policy, the underinsurance carrier may be forced to defend the tortfeasor to prove that the
injured insured is exaggerating his or her damages. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 279.21(b)(4) (Supp.
1985).
79. See id. Under the amended statute the court must determine that the tortfeasor has been
given the right "to select counsel of his own choice" before allowing the tortfeasor's liability carrier
the right to drop out of the suit.
80. 12 G. COUCH, supra note 38, § 45:24, at 255.
19861 1419
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
policies, however, contradicts the general purpose of the underinsured motorist
statute-to provide compensation for the innocent victim of an underinsured
tortfeasor. 1 Furthermore, the amendment's restriction on stacking denies poli-
cyholders coverage for which they have paid and have a right to expect. Simi-
larly, the amendment may deprive the policyholder of another benefit of liability
coverage-the insurer's duty to defend.
With this amendment to the Underinsured Motorist Statute, the North
Carolina General Assembly has sought to provide an equitable and efficient res-
olution of the conflicts surrounding the rights of parties caught in the underin-
surance morass. The carefully planned and even-handed procedure for
subrogation and settlement included in the amendment is a significant step to-
ward that end. Nevertheless, the arbitrary restriction on stacking and the ero-
sion of the insurer's duty to defend have no rightful place in a "remedial statute
[designed to be] liberally construed so that the beneficial purpose intended by its
enactment... may be accomplished."'82 The North Carolina General Assembly
should reconsider its decision to include these changes in the uninsured motorist
statute.
JOHN F. BUCKLEY
81. See Moore v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 270 N.C. 532, 535, 155 S.E.2d 128, 130 (1967) (stating
the general purposes of the uninsured motorist statute).
82. Id. at 535, 155 S.E.2d at 131.
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Bad Faith Refusal to Pay First-Party Insurance Claims: A
Growing Recognition of Extra-Contract Damages
The tort of bad faith,1 now recognized by a growing number of jurisdic-
tions, 2 has extended the liability of insurance companies in first-party insurance
actions. 3 Acknowledging that a special relationship exists between an insurer
and insured, most courts have reevaluated traditional common-law principles
when dealing with an insurance company that has breached its duty to act in
good faith toward its insured. 4 Furthermore, the vast resources of the insurance
industry5 and the public interest inherent in insurance6 have prompted courts to
provide expansive tort remedies to aggrieved policyholders in first-party bad
faith actions.
The insured's purchase of insurance establishes a contract in which the in-
surer promises to pay a designated or ascertainable sum when certain contingen-
cies occur.7 The insured seeks peace of mind that the insurer will provide
bargained-for relief to prevent further hardship should a serious personal or fi-
nancial setback occur. When a breach of contract occurs, the long standing rule
of Hadley v. Baxendale8 limits consequential damages to those damages either
1. The tort of bad faith developed in response to abusive settlement practices by insurers in
third-party insurance actions. See W. SHERNOFF, M. GAGE, & H. LEVIN, INSURANCE BAD FArrIH
LITIGATION § 5.02, at 5-4 (1985) [hereinafter cited as W. SHERNOEF]. For example, a liability in-
surer defending an insured against liability for injuring a third person might refuse to settle, thereby
exposing the insured to the risk of a judgment in excess of the policy limits. Id. § 3.01, at 3-4 to 3-5.
To deter such conduct, courts developed the rule that when an insurer refuses to settle and the
refusal is in bad faith, the insurer will be liable for the excess judgment. Id. at 3-5. Characterizing
the action as a tort allows the insured to recover a broader range of damages generally not available
in claims based on breach of contract. Id. § 2.02[2] at 2-5.
2. See, e-g., Washington v. Group Hospitalization, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 517 (D.D.C. 1984); Rod-
gers v. Pennsylvania Life Ins. Co., 539 F. Supp. 879 (S.D. Iowa 1982); Phillips v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co., 473 F. Supp. 984 (D. Vt. 1979); Chavers v. National See. Fire & Cas. Co., 405 So. 2d I (Ala.
1981); Noble v. National Am. Life Ins. Co., 128 Ariz. 188, 624 P.2d 866 (1981); Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co. v. Broadway Arms Corp., 281 Ark. 128, 664 S.W.2d 463 (1984); Grand Sheet Metal Prod. Co. v.
Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 34 Conn. Supp. 46, 375 A.2d 428 (1977); Ledingham v. Blue Cross Plan,
29 Ill. App. 3d 339, 330 N.E.2d 540 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, 64 Ill. 2d 338, 356 N.E.2d 75
(1976); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Peterson, 91 Nev. 617, 540 P.2d 1070 (1975); Dailey v.
Integon Gen. Ins. Corp., 75 N.C. App. 387, 331 S.E.2d 148, disc rev. denied, 314 N.C. 664, 336
S.E.2d 399 (1985); Corwin Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 279 N.W.2d 638
(N.D. 1979); Christian v. American Home Assur. Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1978); Bibeault v. Hano-
ver Ins. Co., 417 A.2d 313 (R.I. 1980); Nichols v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 279 S.C. 336, 306
S.E.2d 616 (1983); Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 271 N.W.2d 368 (1978).
3. First-party insurance policies indemnify an insured for a personal loss covered under the
insurance contract. The special relationship between insurer and insured creates an implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing in the insurance contract. W. SHERNOFF, supra note 1, § 5.02, at
5-4. The breach of the duty constitutes a tort, separate and distinct from the contract, allowing an
insured to recover tort damages for an insurer's bad faith refusal to pay. See infra notes 37-48 and
accompanying text; cf Daily v. Integon Gen. Ins. Co., 75 N.C. App. 387, 395-96, 331 S.E.2d 148,
154 (punitive damages are recoverable even though the tort constitutes or accompanies a breach of
contract), disc. rev. denied, 314 N.C. 664, 336 S.E.2d 399 (1985).
4. See infra notes 7-22 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
7. J. MCCARTHY, PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN BAD FAITH CASES § 1.1, at 2-3 (1983).
8. 9 Ex. Ch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). Most states including North Carolina have
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arising naturally from the breach or reasonably within the contemplation of the
parties at the time the contract was made.9 The breach of an insurance contract
frequently results in the insured suffering consequential damages such as emo-
tional distress, economic loss, inconvenience, and legal expenses. However, an
insured often cannot recover these damages for two important reasons. First,
courts strictly construe the Hadley concept of foreseeability to limit damages to
those specifically related to the rights and duties set forth in the contract."1 Sec-
ond, even when specific consequences are foreseeable, the insurance contract is
typically viewed as an agreement to pay money and, therefore, recovery of dam-
ages is limited to the amount due under the contract plus interest. 1 Moreover,
the insured cannot recover punitive damages because such damages are gener-
ally not awarded in breach of contract actions, regardless of how willful, mali-
cious, or fraudulent the breach.
12
Given the limitations of traditional contract remedies, an insurance com-
pany could refuse to pay a legitimate claim without risking any more than if it
had paid the claim immediately.13 In fact, when commercial interest rates are
above legal interest rates, it may actually be profitable for an insurance company
to withhold payment on a claim. 14 As a result, an insured can be forced to incur
substantial legal expenses in order to recover benefits under the policy.15 Faced
with this alternative, an insured may settle for an amount far below what he or
she would be entitled to under the policy.
16
To deter unethical conduct by insurance companies, a growing number of
jurisdictions now allow extra-contract damages 17 in cases in which an insurer
has acted in bad faith. Based on tort law principles,18 an insurer's bad faith
adopted the Hadley limitation on damages. See, e.g., Price v. Goodman, 226 N.C. 223, 228-29, 37
S.E.2d 592, 596 (1946).
9. Hadley, 9 Ex. Ch. at 354, 156 Eng. Rep. at 151.
10. See W. SHERNOFF, supra note 1, § 7.02[2], at 7-6 to -7 & n.11.
11. See Insurance Co. v. Piaggio, 83 U.S. 378, 386 (1872); see also Pennsylvania Thresherman
& Farmers Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Robertson, 157 F. Supp. 405, 411 (M.D.N.C. 1957) (insurer's
liability to insured limited to value of policy plus interest), rev'd on other grounds, 259 F.2d 389 (4th
Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 950 (1959).
12. See Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 400, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 92
(1970); St. Paul at Chase Corp. v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 262 Md. 192, 236-39, 278 A.2d 12,
33-35, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 857 (1971); King v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 273 N.C. 396, 398, 159
S.E.2d 891, 893 (1968).
13. Note, Increasing Liability for Refusal To Pay First Party Claims: Bad Faith and Punitive
Damages, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 685, 685-86 (1977).
14. Id. at 686. In recent years, the legal interest rates have been far below the commercial rates.
As a result, the interest earned by the insurance company while litigation is pending will usually be
substantial compared to the amount it will pay under the lower legal interest rate. W. SHERNOF2,
supra note 1, § 7.01, at 7-3.
15. W. SHERNOFF, supra note 1, § 7.01, at 7-3
16. W. SHERNOFF, supra note 1, § 7.01, at 7-3.
17. "Extra-contract" damages refer to damages, whether compensatory or punitive, that are
recoverable in excess of the benefits provided under an insurance contract or the policy proceeds
recovered because of a loss. G. Kornblum, Defense of a First-Party Extra Contract Claims Action
Against a Life, Health and Accident Insurer, 29 AM. JUR. TRIALS 481, 489 (1982). For a discussion
of extra-contract damages in North Carolina, see Comment, "Extra-Contractual" Remedies for
Breach of Contract in North Carolina, 55 N.C.L. REV. 1125 (1977).
18. Unlike contract law, which focuses primarily on the consensual agreement of the parties,
tort law imposes duties of conduct influenced by social policy. W. SHERNOF, supra note 1,
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refusal19 to settle with its insured may constitute a tort allowing the insured to
recover damages for emotional distress, as well as economic losses associated
with the tortious conduct. 20 In addition, when the insurer's conduct is accom-
panied by some type of aggravated conduct, the insured also can be awarded
punitive damages. 21 In a series of cases decided by the North Carolina courts, it
has become clear that an insurance company can be held liable in North Caro-
lina for punitive damages for a tortious, bad faith refusal to settle with its in-
sured.22 This Note examines the evolution of the tort of bad faith and addresses
the implications extra-contract damages may have on North Carolina insurance
law, as well as noninsurance commercial law.
A cause of action for fraud was the first legal theory used by courts to
provide an insured with a tort measure of recovery for an insurer's failure to pay
on a policy. By combining a contract claim with a tort action for fraud, the
insured could recover the benefits of the policy plus punitive damages.23 The
plaintiff, however, was frequently faced with the obstacle of proving the insurer's
fraudulent intent at the time the contract was made.24 Given that the plaintiff's
grievances usually concerned bad faith settlement practices that took place after
the claim for payment arose, the insured often had difficulty establishing a fraud-
ulent act relating to the formation of the insurance contract.2 5 To overcome this
barrier, the California Court of Appeals in Wetherbee v. United Insurance Co. of
America2 6 allowed the plaintiff to recover for fraud by permitting the insurer's
post-contract conduct to support an inference of precontract fraudulent in-
tent.27 Although this approach eased a plaintiff's burden of proof for fraudulent
§ 7.02[1], at 7-5 to -6. Because of this distinction there is a marked difference between the measure
of damages recoverable under each theory. In breach of contract actions, courts attempt to place the
aggrieved party in the position he or she would have been in had the contract not been breached. Id.
at 7-6. In tort actions, the plaintiff is compensated for all damages proximately caused by the de-
fendant's conduct, regardless of whether the damages could have been anticipated by the defendant.
Id.
19. What constitutes bad faith conduct varies among jurisdictions. Situations that evince a bad
faith refusal to pay a claim include: (1) an insurance company's rejection of a claim even though it
clearly has a legal obligation to pay, (2) an insurer's failure to properly investigate a claim and
refusal to pay a claim without a reasonable basis for doing so, and (3) deliberate and abusive conduct
by an insurer in an attempt to force the insured to settle for an amount far below what is reasonable.
See W. SHERNOFF, supra note 1, § 5.111] to -.12[l], at 5-12 to -15.
20. Such damages are generally recoverable in a tort action. See supra note 18.
21. See infra notes 70-73 and accompanying text & text accompanying note 79.
22. See infra notes 85-95 and accompanying text.
23. See Comment, The Avalaibility of Excess Damages for Wrongful Refusal to Honor First
Party Insurance Claims-An Emerging Trend, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 164, 171 (1976).
24. Note, supra note 13, at 692.
25. W. SHERNOFF, supra note 1, § 1.06, at 1-16.
26. 265 Cal. App. 2d 921, 71 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1968). Plaintiff in Wetherbee became worried that
her disability policy could be terminated at the will of the insurer. Id. at 925, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 766.
As a result, plaintiff returned the policy and requested reimbursement of her premium. Defendant
assured plaintiff that the policy would not be terminated if she became disabled. Because of these
assurances, plaintiff elected to continue making payments on her policy. After plaintiff became dis-
abled, however, the insurer refused to make payments under the policy. Id. at 926-27, 71 Cal. Rptr.
at 767.
27. Note, supra note 13, at 692. The court stated that defendant's fraudulent intent not to
abide by its previous representations could be inferred from its discontinuance of benefits.
Wetherbee, 265 Cal. App. 2d at 932, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 769-70.
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intent, an insured typically experienced difficulty proving fraud based on the
insurer's post-claim conduct.
28
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress provided an alterna-
tive means by which first-party insureds could recover damages outside the pol-
icy limits. 29 The elements of the tort include extreme and outrageous conduct
by the defendant with the intent to cause, or reckless disregard of causing, severe
emotional distress, and severe emotional distress resulting from the defendant's
wrongful conduct.a0 Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Co.3 1 was the
first case to uphold an insured's claim for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress against a first-party insurer. 32 Since Fletcher, several courts have awarded
damages based on this theory of recovery. 33 These courts'have found two fac-
tors determinative of outrageous conduct by insurance companies: (1) the use of
extreme "bullying tactics" and other "high pressure" methods to force the in-
sured into settling;34 and (2) the insurer's possession of knowledge that the in-
sured is particularly susceptible to emotional distress by reason of some physical
or mental condition. 35 Although intentional infliction of emotional distress al-
lows tort recovery by some insureds for unfair claims practices, this remedy is
far from ideal. The requirement that the defendant's conduct be outrageous,
and perhaps more importantly, that the plaintiff suffer severe emotional distress,
diminishes the utility of the tort as a remedy in first-party insurance actions.
3 6
28. W. SHERNOFF, supra note 1, § 1.06, at 1-17.
29. See, eg., Eckenrode v. Life of Am. Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1, 3-5 (7th Cir. 1972) (applying
Illinois law); Fletcher v. Western Natl Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 396-98, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78,
90-91 (1970); World Ins. Co. v. Wright, 308 So. 2d 612 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 322 So. 2d
913 (Fla. 1975).
30. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 46 (1965). To recover, the plaintiff must show
that the defendant's conduct was "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a
civilized community." Id. § 46 comment d.
31. 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
32. In Fletcher the insurer refused to pay the insured approximately $50,000 under a disability
insurance policy. The insurer alleged that the disability resulted from an illness, for which two years
of benefits were to be provided under the policy, rather than by an accident, for which thirty years of
benefits were to be provided under the policy. Id. at 388, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 84. The insurer subse-
quently acted in bad faith by refusing to make payments under the policy and directing false and
threatening communications to the insured to force an unreasonable settlement. Id. at 389-92, 89
Cal. Rptr. at 85-87. Presented with these facts, the court had little trouble finding extreme and
outrageous conduct on the part of the insurer and imposed liability for the tort of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. Id. at 401, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
33. See cases cited supra note 29. The North Carolina Court of Appeals in Daily v. Integon
Gen. Ins. Corp., 75 N.C. App. 387, 331 S.E.2d 148, disc. rev. denied, 314 N.C. 664, 336 S.E.2d 399
(1985), suggested that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress could be recognized for
an insurer's bad faith refusal to settle a claim. Id. at 400-01, 331 S.E.2d at 157-58. The court found,
however, that plaintiff failed to show that he had suffered any compensable emotional distress and
therefore dismissed plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages. Id. at 401, 331 S.E.2d at 158.
34. Eckenrode v. Life of Am. Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir. 1972) (applying Illinois law).
For a further discussion of bad faith conduct, see supra note 19.
35. Eckenrode v. Life of Am. Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir. 1972) (applying Illinois law); see
Comment, supra note 23, at 175.
36. W. SHERNOFE, supra note 1, § 1.06, at 1-20. Frequently, an insured's mental anguish does
not flow directly from the defendant's conduct, but from the personal and financial losses caused by
the insurer's refusal to pay. Comment, supra note 23, at 177. The tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, however, does not compensate for the invasion of economic interests. Id. Recog-
nizing these difficulties associated with the tort, the court in Fletcher held that the insured could also
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Given the limitations of actions for fraud and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, most courts have relied on the tort of bad faith to impose tort
liability for improper claims practices by insurers. 37 An insurer's bad faith re-
fusal to pay a valid first-party insurance claim was first recognized in Gruenberg
v. Aetna Insurance Co..38 In Gruenberg the California Supreme Court stated
that the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing applies to all insurance con-
tracts and that an insurer has an obligation not to deprive the insured of the
policy's benefits.3 9 Thus, an insurance company's bad faith and unreasonable
withholding of payments to an insured subjects the insurer to liability in tort.4°
recover under the theory of tortious interference with a protected property interest. Fletcher, 10 Cal.
App. 3d at 401-02, 89 Cal Rptr. at 93-94. This allowed the insured to recover emotional damages
without showing outrageous conduct by the insurer, and without suffering severe emotional distress.
See W. SHERNOEF, supra note 1, § 1.06, at 1-21. In addition, the insured could be compensated for
other types of damage, such as economic loss caused by the defendant's conduct and possibly puni-
tive damages. Fletcher, 10 Cal. App. 3d at 401-02, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94. Recovery for tortious
interference with a protected property interest has not gained widespread acceptance because most
courts have relied on the tort of bad faith to impose tort liability for unfair insurance claims prac-
tices. W. SHERNOF, supra note 1, § 1.06, at 1-21.
37. The pioneering case in bad faith litigation was Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50
Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958), an action by the insured against his insurer for refusing to settle
within the policy limits. Id. at 657, 328 P.2d at 200. The insurer's refusal to settle with the third
party led to a judgment against the insured for an amount in excess of his policy limits. Id. The
California Supreme Court imposed an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing on insurance
contracts and stated that this duty of good faith "requires an insurer to settle in an appropriate case
although the express terms of the policy do not impose such a duty." Id. at 659, 328 P.2d at 201.
Furthermore, the insurer must give the interests of the insured equal consideration when evaluating
a settlement offer. Id. The court held that the defendant's breach of this duty, in addition to giving
rise to an action for breach of the insurance contract, gave rise to a tort action for bad faith. Id.
Therefore, the insurer could be found liable for an amount in excess of the policy limit. Id. at 660-
61, 328 P.2d at 202. For a further discussion of third party claims, see supra note 1.
38. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973). Plaintiff in Gruenberg was the
owner of a nightclub, insured under three separate policies, that was damaged by fire. Id. at 570, 510
P.2d at 1034, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 482. Criminal charges were brought against the insured for the
crimes of arson and defrauding an insurer, but were subsequently dismissed for lack of probable
cause. Id. at 570-71, 570 P.2d at 1034-35, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 482-83. In the interim, the insurers'
counsel requested that Gruenberg appear for an examination under oath concerning the fire loss. Id.
at 570, 570 P.2d at 1034, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 482. Provisions of the California Insurance Code gave
the insurer the right to request such an examination. Id. Gruenberg's counsel responded that he
had instructed his client to make no statements concerning the fire while the felony charges were still
pending. Id. at 570-71, 510 P.2d at 1034-35, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 482-83. Insurer's counsel replied that
Gruenberg's failure to appear would be treated as a breach of contract and that coverage for the loss
would be denied. Id. at 571, 570 P.2d at 1035, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 483. After the criminal charges
were dismissed, Gruenberg's attorney advised the insurers that his client was prepared to submit to
an examination. The insurers, however, reaffirmed that liability was to be denied because of plain-
tiff's earlier failure to appear. Id.
Gruenberg brought a cause of action in tort against defendants for breach of the implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 573, 510 P.2d at 1036, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 484. The court
held that plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to state a cause of action in tort. Id. at 581, 510 P.2d at
1042, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
39. Id. at 573, 510 P.2d at 1036, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 484. This duty was first recognized in third-
party insurance actions. See supra note 37.
40. Gruenberg, 9 Cal. 3d at 575, 510 P.2d at 1038, 108 Cal Rptr. at 486. Since Gruenberg, a
number of courts have imposed tort liability on insurers for breaching the implied duty of good faith
in first-party actions. See, eg., Escambia Treating Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 421 F. Supp. 1367
(N.D. Fla. 1976); Grand Sheet Metal Prod. Co. v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 34 Conn. Supp. 46, 375
A.2d 428 (1977); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Peterson, 91 Nev. 617, 540 P.2d 1070 (1975);
Corwin Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 279 N.W.2d 638 (N.D. 1979); Chris-
tian v. American Home Assur. Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1978).
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Although some disparity exists as to the rationale behind allowing extra-
contract damages,41 most courts agree on the factors needed to establish bad
faith. In Anderson v. Continental Insurance Co.42 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
identified the elements of a claim for first-party bad faith against an insurer as
(1) an absence of a reasonable basis for denying benefits to the insured under the
policy; and (2) knowledge or reckless disregard of the lack of a reasonable basis
for denying the claim.4 3 The reasonableness of the denial of a claim is judged by
the reasonable person standard common to tort law.g4 The Anderson standard
also requires an intentional wrongdoing on the part of the insurer 45 for the in-
sured to recover compensatory damages in a bad faith action. This requirement
of intentional or reckless conduct by the insurer approaches the standard applied
by most courts in awarding punitive damages.4 6 Although some courts have
adopted this higher degree of culpability in bad faith actions, 47 others have not
distinguished between negligent and intentional behavior. 48
Despite this trend in insurance bad faith litigation, many jurisdictions have
refused to recognize the bad faith tort in first-party insurance actions. 49 These
courts assert that through statutory penalties such as fines, imprisonment, and
the imposition of attorney's fees, the legislature has provided adequate protec-
tion to the public against unfair claims practices by first-party insurers.50 More-
41. Note, An Insurer's Bad Faith Refusal to Pay a Valid First Party Claim: A Tort Whose Time
Has Come in Iowa, 32 DRAKE L. REV. 987, 989-90 (1983).
42. 85 Wis. 2d 675, 271 N.W.2d 368 (1978).
43. Id. at 691, 271 N.W.2d at 376. In Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 470 So. 2d 1060 (Ala.
1984), the Alabama Supreme Court established the following elements of a first-party bad faith
action:
(a) an insurance contract between the parties and a breach thereof by the defendant; (b) an
intentional refusal to pay the insured's claim; (c) the absence of any reasonably legitimate
or arguable reason for that refusal (the absence of a debatable reason); (d) the insurer's
actual knowledge of the absence of any legitimate or arguable reason; (e) if the intentional
failure to determine the existence of a lawful basis is relied upon, the plaintiff must prove
the insurer's intentional failure to determine whether there is a legitimate or arguable rea-
son to refuse to pay the claim.
Id. at 1071 (quoting National Sec. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Bowen, 417 So. 2d 179, 183 (Ala. 1982)).
44. See Note, supra note 41, at 991-92.
45. See W. SHERNOFF, supra note 1, § 5.03[3], at 5-10.1.
46. W. SHERNOFF, supra note 1, § 5.03[3], at 5-10.
47. See, e.g., Chavers v. National Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 405 So. 2d 1, 6 (Ala. 1981) (actionable
tort recognized for an insurer's intentional refusal to pay a direct claim); Aetna Cas. and Surety Co.
v. Broadway Arms Co., 281 Ark. 128, 131, 664 S.W.2d 463, 465 (1984) ("claim based on the tort of
bad faith must include affirmative misconduct by the insurance company, without a good faith de-
fense, and... the misconduct must be dishonest, malicious, or oppressive in an attempt to avoid its
liability under an insurance policy"); Gruenberg, 9 Cal. 3d at 375, 510 P.2d at 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. at
486 (insurer has the "duty not to threaten to withold or actually withold payments, maliciously and
without probable cause, for the purpose of injuring its insured").
48. Note, supra note 41, at 991-92.
49. See, eg., Spencer v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 227 Kan. 914, 611 P.2d 149 (1980); Lawton
v. Great S.W. Fire Ins. Co., 118 N.H. 607, 392 A.2d 576 (1978); Farris v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co.,
284 Or. 453, 587 P.2d 1015 (1978); D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 494 Pa.
501, 431 A.2d 966 (1981); Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985).
50. See Spencer v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 227 Kan. 914, 926, 611 P.2d 149, 158 (1980)
("[W]e hold the [legislative] remedies are adequate to force compliance with the terms of insurance
contracts."); see also Debolt v. Mutual of Omaha, 56 Ill. App. 3d 111, 116, 371 N.E.2d 373, 377
(1978) ("Where the legislature has provided a remedy on a subject matter we are not only loath but
in addition harbor serious doubts as to the desirability and wisdom of implementing or expanding
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over, many of these courts have found the policy arguments underlying a first-
party bad faith tort to be unpersuasive.
51
Courts that allow extra-contract damages emphasize that the special rela-
tionship between the insurer and insured justifies imposing a broader legal re-
sponsibility on insurance companies.5 2  Most of these courts focus on the
disparity of financial resources between insurer and insured and the inequality of
bargaining power that necessarily follows. 53 By exposing insurance companies
to tort liability, the courts attempt to equalize the relationship between the par-
ties and ensure that the insured receives the expected benefit of the bargain.
5 4
A second factor cited by most courts to support extra-contract damages is
the public interest 55 inherent in the insurance industry. Because the insurance
industry is affected with a public interest5 6 and is frequently regarded as quasi-
the legislative remedy by judicial decree."); Lawton v. Great S.W. Fire Ins. Co., 118 N.H. 607, 614,
392 A.2d 576, 581 (1978) ("Tlhe legislature has established mechanisms designed to deal with in-
surer malfeasance in this area, which, in our opinion, vitiates the need for recognition of a new cause
of action in tort."); D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 494 Pa. 501, 507, 431
A.2d 966, 970 (1981) ("[Tlhere is no evidence to suggest... [that] the Unfair Insurance Practices
Act ... must be supplemented by a judicially created cause of action."). But cf. Phillips v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 473 F. Supp. 984, 990 & n.4 (D. Vt. 1979) (stating that a Vermont statute's require-
ment of prompt payment of insurance claims added support to a recognition of a cause of action in
tort); Christian v. American Home Assur. Co., 577 P.2d 899, 904-05 (Okla. 1978) (relying on an
Oklahoma statute and holding that a bad faith rejection of an insurance claim gives rise to an action
in tort). For a further discussion of legislative remedies see infra note 60.
51. For a discussion of the policy arguments supporting a first party bad faith tort, see infra
notes 53-68 and accompanying text.
52. See W. SHERNOFF, supra note 1, § 1.01, at 1-3 to -4.
53. See Rodgers v. Pennsylvania Life Ins. Co., 539 F. Supp. 879, 883 (S.D. Iowa 1982) (An
insured may be "particularly vulnerable to oppressive tactics on the part of an economically power-
ful entity.") (quoting Amsden v. Ginnell Mut. Reinsurance Co., 203 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Iowa 1972));
Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 820, 620 P.2d 141, 146, 169 Cal. Rptr. 691, 696
(1979) (relationship between the insurer and insured is inherently unbalanced), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
912 (1980); Grand Sheet Metal Prod. Co. v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 34 Conn. Supp. 46, 51, 375
A.2d 428, 430 (1977) ("[Ihe unequal bargaining power of the parties, the special nature of the
insurance business, and the disasterous economic effects that a bad-faith refusal to pay may cause the
insured are paramount considerations."); Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 116, 229
S.E.2d 297, 303 (1976) ("[B]ecause of the great disparity of financial resources which generally exists
between insurer and insured ... we recognize the wisdom of a rule which would deter refusals on the
part of insurers to pay valid claims when the refusals are both unjustified and in bad faith.").
54. W. SHERNOFF, supra note 1, § 1.03, at 1-9. Because insurance policies are frequently held
to be adhesion contracts, it is not surprising that courts have allowed tort remedies to assure full
compliance with the terms of the agreement. See Rodgers v. Pennsylvania Life Ins. Co., 539 F.
Supp. 879, 883 (S.D. Iowa 1982) ("Insurance policies are simply contracts of adhesion under which
the insured's 'chances of successfully negotiating with the company for any substantial change in the
proposed contract are just about zero.' ") (quoting C&J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227
N.W.2d 169, 174 (Iowa 1975)); Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 820, 620 P.2d
141, 146, 169 Cal. Rptr. 691, 696 (1979) (adhesion nature of insurance contracts puts the insurer in a
superior bargaining position), cerL denied, 445 U.S. 912 (1980); see also Brown v. South Carolina
Ins. Co., 284 S.C. 47, 54, 324 S.E.2d 641, 645 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984) ("[l]nsurance contracts are not
ordinary negotiated commercial contracts [because] [t]hey are marketed and purchased as a stan-
dardized product."), cerL granted in part and denied in part, 285 S.C. 456, 329 S.E.2d 768 (1985).
55. Public interest is "[s]omething in which the public, the community at large, has some pecu-
niary interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected." BLACK's LAW
DICTIONARY 1106 (5th ed. 1979).
56. See Grand Sheet Metal Prod. Co. v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 34 Conn. Supp. 46, 51, 375
A.2d 428, 430 (1972); Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 116, 229 S.E.2d 297, 303
(1976); Nichols v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 279 S.C. 336, 340, 306 S.E.2d 616, 619 (1983).
But cf. Farris v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co.. 284 Or. 453, 467, 587 P.2d 1015, 1023 (1978)
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public in nature,57 insurers' conduct has been subject to strict scrutiny by the
judiciary. 58 A comparison is often made between insurance companies and
common carriers or public utilities.59 As a result, insurance companies are not
treated like ordinary commercial businesses, but are deemed to have additional
obligations as quasi-public entities.
60
(noting that because the legislature recognized the public interest in the enforcement of insurance
contracts and provided penalties for wrongful conduct, it is inappropriate to use further civil
penalties).
57. See, ag., Christian v. American Home Assur. Co., 577 P.2d 899, 904 (Okla. 1978) ("We
have recognized the quasi-public nature of insurance companies and the need to subject the compa-
nies to state control for the protection and benefit of the public."). One commentary notes:
The insurers' obligations are... rooted in their status as purveyors of a vital service
labeled quasi-public in nature. Suppliers of services affected with a public interest must
take the public's interest seriously, where necessary placing it before their interest in maxi-
mizing gains and limiting disbursements.... [A]s a supplier of a public service rather than
a manufactured product, the obligations of insurers go beyond meeting reasonable expecta-
tions of coverage. The obligations of good faith and fair dealing encompass qualities of
decency and humanity inherent in the responsibilities of a fiduciary. Insurers hold them-
selves out as fiduciaries, and with the public's trust must go private responsibility conso-
nant with that trust.
Goodman & Seaton, Forward: Ripe for Decision, Internal Workings and Current Concerns of the
California Supreme Court, 62 CALIF. L. Rav. 309, 346-47 (1974).
58. See Goodman & Seaton, supra note 57, at 346-47; see, ag., Washington v. Group Hospitali-
zation, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 517, 521 (D.D.C. 1984) ("[A]n insurer has additional obligations to its
insured which subject it to more stringent standards of conduct than those normally imposed on
parties to a contract.").
59. The North Carolina Supreme Court in Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105,
229 S.E.2d 297 (1976), made reference to the similarities between insurance companies, common
carriers, and public utilities. Id. at 116, 229 S.E.2d at 303. By making this comparison, the court
expressed its willingness to hold insurers liable for punitive damages in breach of contract actions,
Punitive damages have long been awarded against public utilities and common carriers for a breach
of duty to serve the public. Note, supra note 13, at 706.
60. Additional obligations have been imposed on insurance companies through governmental
regulation of insurance settlement practices. States have enacted Unfair Trade Practices Acts to
regulate trade practices in the insurance business. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3005 (1980 &
Supp. 1983); CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03 (West 1972 & Supp. 1986); Mo. REV. STAT. § 375.936
(Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1986); TEx. INS, CODE ANN. § 21.21-2 (Vernon 1981); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 38.1-52.9 (1981).
North Carolina law provides a list of unfair and deceptive acts or practices in connection with
the settlement of insurance claims:
b. Failing to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communications with re-
spect to claims arising under insurance policies; ...
d. Refusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation based upon all
available information; ...
f. Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlements of
claims in which liability has become reasonably clear;
g. Compelling [the] insured to institute litigation to recover amounts due under an insur-
ance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately recovered in actions
brought by such insured;
h. Attempting to settle a claim for less than the amount to which a reasonable man would
have believed he was entitled;
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-54.4(11) (1982). The general assembly recently amended this statute to apply
to third party as well as first party insurance claims. See S. 873, § 18, N.C. Gen. Assembly, 1985
Session (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-54.4(l 1)).
Under N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-54.5 to -54.7 (1982), the Commissioner of Insurance has the
power "to investigate, bring charges, and issue cease and desist orders" to remedy unfair trade prac-
tices in the insurance industry. Commissioner of Ins. v. Integon Life Ins. Co., 28 N.C. App. 7, 11,
220 S.E.2d 409, 413 (1975). In addition, North Carolina courts have held that N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 75-1.1 (1985), a statute proscribing unfair or deceptive acts affecting commerce, provides a private
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Courts also have focused on the deterrence inherent in a tort theory of re-
covery. 61 Absent a threat of tort liability, including a threat of punitive dam-
ages, an insurer "could intentionally and unreasonably refuse payment of a
legitimate claim with veritable impunity."' 62 Typically, the insured does not
have adequate resources to engage in protracted litigation to obtain relief under
the insurance policy. Indeed, the high pressure tactics used by insurers, coupled
with the insured's own personal and financial plight, make the insured particu-
larly vulnerable to an unfair settlement offer. 63 An insured purchases insurance
for both financial security and peace of mind, 64 and allowing a tort action for an
insurer's bad faith refusal to settle ensures that the policyholder will recover the
full benefits of the insurance contract.
A final rationale supporting the tort of bad faith is the concept that a fiduci-
ary relationship 65 exists between an insurer and insured. Courts have reasoned
that because a fiduciary duty has long been recognized in third-party situa-
tions, 66 an extension of the duty to first-party situations is appropriate. 67 Be-
cause of the distinction between first-party and third-party insurance actions,
however, a number of courts have expressly refused to adopt this rationale.
68
cause of action for unfair trade practices in the insurance industry. Ellis v. Smith Broadhurst, Inc.,
48 N.C. App. 180, 183, 268 S.E.2d 271, 273 (1980). Moreover, the North Carolina Supreme Court
in Pearce v. American Defender Life Ins. Co., 316 N.C. 461, 373 S.E.2d 174 (1986) held that "a
violation of N.C.G.S. § 58-54.4 as a matter of law constitutes an unfair or deceptive trade practice in
violation of N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1." Id. at 470, 373 S.E.2d at 179. The amendment to N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 58-54.4(11), however, casts doubt as to whether a violation of § 58-54.4(11) constitutes a per se
violation of § 75-1.1. See S. 873, § 18, N.C. Gen. Assembly, 1985 Session (to be codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 58-54.4(11)) ("no violation of this subsection shall of itself create any cause of action in
favor of any person other than the Commissioner") (emphasis added).
In addition, a number of states have enacted statutes that provide for recovery of attorney's fees
in suits against insurers to recover benefits under an insurance policy. See, eg., KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-256 (1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-1-616 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-9-320 (Law. Co-op.
1985); TEX. INS. CODE. ANN. § 1.14-1(7) (Vernon 1981). The North Carolina statute provides that
in a suit against an insurance company for an unwarranted refusal to pay a claim, when the recovery
of damages is $5,000 or less, the court in its discretion, may allow a reasonable fee to the attorney
representing the party obtaining a judgment for damages, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-21.1 (1981).
61. See, eg., Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 116, 229 S.E.2d 297, 303 (1976)
("[W]e recognize the wisdom of a rule which would deter refusals on the part of insurers to pay valid
claims when the refusals are both unjustified and in bad faith."); Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co.,
85 Wis. 2d 675, 697, 271 N.W.2d 368, 379 (1978) ("Punitive damages are awarded to punish wrong-
ful conduct and to serve as a deterrent.").
62. Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Veal, 354 So. 2d 239, 248 (Miss. 1977).
63. See Eckenrode v. Life of Am. Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1, 5 (7th Cir. 1972); Rodgers v. Penn-
sylvania Life Ins. Co., 539 F. Supp. 879, 883 (S.D. Iowa 1982).
64. One of the primary reasons a consumer purchases insurance is the peace of mind and secur-
ity that it provides in the event of a loss. McCorkle v. Great Atlantic Ins. Co., 637 P.2d 583, 588
(Okla. 1981); see Eckenrode v. Life of Am. Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1, 5 (7th Cir. 1972); Feathers v. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 667 S.W.2d 693, 696 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
65. A fiduciary relationship is "[o]ne founded on trust or confidence reposed by one person in
the integrity and fidelity of another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 564 (5th ed. 1979).
66. See supra note I and infra note 68.
67. See Goodman & Seaton, supra note 57, at 346-47; see also Brown v. South Carolina Ins.
Co., 284 S.C. 47, 54-55, 324 S.E.2d 641, 646, (S.C. Ct. App. 1984) (relation of the insurer to its
insured is more than simply a debtor-creditor relationship), cert granted in part and denied in part,
285 S.C. 456, 329 S.E. 2d 768 (1985).
68. See, e.g., Spencer v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 227 Kan. 914, 922, 611 P.2d 149, 155
(1980) (The relationship in first-party situations is adversarial in nature.); Duncan v. Andrew
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There is consensus among a growing number of jurisdictions that a tort
action for bad faith serves as an effective deterrent against unfair claims prac-
tices. More importantly, the threat of insurers' liability for punitive damages
has prompted widespread reform in the insurance industry.6 9 The development
of first-party bad faith actions in North Carolina has focused primarily on puni-
tive damage awards for deleterious insurance settlement practices.
Generally, North Carolina decisions have allowed punitive damages both to
punish a wrongdoer and to serve as a deterrent for future behavior. 70 Although
punitive damages are never recovered as a matter of right,71 if a plaintiff pleads
and proves facts that show some element of aggravation, an award of punitive
damages may be justified. 72 Such aggravated conduct has been defined to in-
clude "fraud, malice, gross negligence, insult, . . . [acting] willfully or under
circumstances of rudeness or oppression, or in a manner which evinces a reck-
less and wanton disregard of the plaintiff's rights."' 73 North Carolina courts
generally do not allow punitive damages in breach of contract actions unless the
contract is a promise to marry.74 Nonetheless, the courts have recognized that
awarding punitive damages may be appropriate in breach of contract actions
with "substantial tort overtones" arising from fraudulent or deceitful conduct. 75
County Mut. Ins. Co., 665 S.W.2d 13, 19-20 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Lawton v. Great S.W. Fire Ins.
Co., 118 N.H. 602, 614, 392 A.2d 576, 581 (1978).
Under third-party liability coverage, when the insured is sued by a third party, the insured's
insurance company defends the suit and "the insured cannot settle the matter without the permission
of the insurer." Craft v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., 572 F.2d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 1978). It is the
insurer's control of the litigation, in addition to the risk of an excess judgment, that gives rise to the
fiduciary nature of the insurer's duty. Id.; see supra note 1.
69. See Levine, Demonstrating and Preserving the Deterrent Effect ofPunitive Damages In In-
surance Bad Faith Actions, 13 U.S.F. L. Rnv. 613, 621-27 (1979).
70. See Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 113, 229 S.E.2d 297, 302 (1976);
Cotton v. Fisheries Prod. Co., 181 N.C. 151, 152-53, 106 S.E. 487, 488 (1921); Motsinger v. Sink,
168 N.C. 548, 551, 84 S.E. 847, 848 (1915). Punitive damages are known as "vindictive damages" or
"smart money" and are vengeful in nature. Ervin, Postscript: Punitive Damages in North Carolina,
59 N.C.L. REv 1255, 1255 (1981).
71. See Oestrieicher v. American Nat'l Stores, Inc., 290 N.C. 118, 134, 225 S.E.2d 797, 807-08
(1976). Punitive damages are never awarded as compensation. They are awarded above and beyond
actual damages as a punishment for the defendant's intentional wrong. Overnite Transp. Co. v.
International Bd. of Teamsters, 257 N.C. 18, 30, 125 S.E.2d 277, 286 (1962).
72. See Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 112, 229 S.E.2d 297, 301 (1976);
Baker v. Winslow, 184 N.C. 1, 5, 113 S.E. 570, 572 (1922).
73. Dailey v. Integon Gen. Ins. Corp., 75 N.C. App. 387, 394, 331 S.E.2d 148, 154 (citing
Baker v. Winslow, 184 N.C. 1, 5, 113 S.E. 570, 572 (1922)), disc. rev. denied, 314 N.C. 664, 336
S.E.2d 399 (1985). Whether the plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to allow the award of punitive
damages is a question of law. Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 111, 229 S.E.2d 297,
300 (1976). Once the pleading requirements are met, it is in the jury's discretion to determine
whether punitive damages should be awarded, and if so, the amount to be awarded. Ervin, supra
note 70, at 1257.
74. Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 111, 229 S.E.2d 297, 301 (1976); King v.
Insurance Co., 273 N.C. 396, 398, 159 S.E.2d 891, 893 (1968); Dailey v. Integon Ins. Corp., 75 N.C.
App. 387, 394, 331 S.E.2d 148, 153, disc. rev. denied, 314 N.C. 664, 336 S.E.2d 399 (1985). The rule
in most jurisdictions is that punitive damages are not allowed even though the breach is willful,
malicious, or oppressive. See J. McCARTHY, supra note 7, § 1.42, at 92-93.
75. Oestreicher v. American Nat'l Stores, Inc., 290 N.C. 118, 136, 225 S.E.2d 797, 809 (1976).
In Oestreicher a lessor brought a breach of contract action against his lessee and demanded punitive
damages based on the continuing fraud involved in the breach. The lease provided that the lessee
was to pay a minimum rental fee plus five percent of the net sales above a stated amount. Id. at 132,
225 S.E.2d at 806. The lessor claimed that the lessee had fraudulently failed to abide by the lease
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In Newton v. Standard Fire Insurance Co. 7 6 plaintiff brought an action seek-
ing punitive damages for the insurer's alleged "heedless, wanton, and oppressive
conduct" in failing to pay the insured's claim, 77 The North Carolina Supreme
Court stated that "where there is an identifiable tort even though the tort also
constitutes, or accompanies, a breach of contract, the tort itself may give rise to
a claim for punitive damages." 78 In addition, the court stated that the tortious
conduct must be accompanied by some element of aggravation before punitive
damages will be awarded. 79 The court concluded that plaintiff's allegations
about the insurer's refusal to pay were insufficient to plead any recognizable tort,
and that the complaint did not establish any intentional wrongdoing by the in-
surer other than the breach itself.80 In dicta, however, the court alluded to the
type of behavior that might have allowed plaintiff to recover for the insurer's bad
faith refusal to pay.8 1 The court also discussed the policy considerations that
would support extra-contract damages in bad faith insurance actions, 82 but em-
phasized that caution should be taken before exposing insurers to liabilities be-
yond those specified in the insurance contract.
8 3
Notwithstanding this caveat, subsequent cases have referred to the Newton
because the lessee intentionally understated gross sales revenue and thereby substantially reduced the
amount to which the lessor was entitled under the contract. Id. at 133, 225 S.E.2d at 806. The court
allowed the lessor's claim for punitive damages because the fraudulent misrepresentation accompa-
nying the breach amounted to a separate tort. Id. at 135-36, 225 S.E.2d at 808.
76. 291 N.C. 105, 229 S.E.2d 297 (1976).
77. Id. at 107, 229 S.E.2d at 298-99. Plaintiff in Newton lost merchandise and suffered damage
due to a theft and burglary. Plaintiff demanded indemnity from the insurer to cover the loss, but the
insurance company refused to pay. Id. at 109, 229 S.E.2d at 300. Plaintiff brought an action against
the insurance company seeking $5,000 in actual damages and $50,000 in punitive damages. Id. at
110, 229 S.E.2d at 300. The trial court dismissed plaintiff's claim for punitive damages. Id. at 111,
229 S.E.2d at 304.
78. Id. at 111, 229 S.E.2d at 301.
79. Id. at 112, 229 S.E.2d at 301.
80. Id. at 114, 229 S.E.2d at 302. Before dismissing plaintiff's punitive damages claim, the
court examined several California cases relied on by plaintiff which supported imposing a special
implied-in-law duty on an insurer not to act in a manner that would deprive the insured of the
policy's benefits. Id. at 115, 229 S.E.2d at 303. The court noted that a common element in all of the
California cases was a bad faith refusal by the insurance company to pay a legitimate claim. Id.
Conversely, plaintiff in Newton made no claims of bad faith, nor did he allege facts that could sup-
port a finding of bad faith. Id.
81. Id. at 115-16, 229 S.E.2d at 303. The court in Newton stated that if plaintiff had claimed
that after a reasonable investigation the insurer determined the claim was valid and nevertheless
denied the claim, or that the insurer refused to investigate at all and the refusal to pay was in bad
faith with an intent to cause harm to plaintiff, a cause of action for punitive damages may have been
allowed. Id.
82. Id. at 116, 229 S.E.2d at 303. The court emphasized two important policy considerations:
the disparity of financial resources between the insurer and insured and the public interest aspect of
the insurance industry. Id. The court's comparison of insurance companies and public utilities
indicated that in certain situations punitive damages might be appropriate in first-party insurance
actions. Id. For a further discussion of policy considerations see supra notes 53-68 and accompany-
ing text.
83. The Newton court stated in dicta:
We are slow to impose upon an insurer liabilities beyond those called for in the insurance
contract. To create exposure to such risks except for the most extreme circumstances
would, we are certain, be detrimental to the consuming public whose insurance premiums
would surely be increased to cover them.
Newton, 291 N.C. at 116, 229 S.E.2d at 303.
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dicta when addressing claims alleging first-party bad faith by an insurerAs4 It
was not until 1982 in Dailey v. Integon General Insurance Corp.85 (Dailey I),
however, that a North Carolina court held an insured had sufficiently alleged a
tortious act accompanied by aggravated conduct so as to state a claim for special
and punitive damages for an insurer's bad faith refusal to settle.8 6 Unlike
Newton, plaintiff in Dailey I specifically pled facts and allegations that supported
"recognizable; aggravated tortious behavior" by the insurance company.87
After remand,88 the court of appeals in Dailey v. Integon General Insurance
Corp. 89 (Dailey II) considered whether the trial court erred in entering a judg-
ment non obstante veredicto against the insured on the issue of punitive dam-
ages. 90 The court held that the trial court erred because plaintiff had produced
evidence at trial that was clearly sufficient to support the jury's finding of a
84. See Shields v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 50 N.C. App. 355, 273 S.E.2d 756 (1981). In
Shields, defendant insurance company refused payment on plaintiff's claim for fire damage. Id. at
356, 273 S.E.2d at 756. Plaintiff brought an action seeking punitive damages, alleging that defendant
carelessly asserted that plaintiff was involved in causing the fire and that plaintiff misrepresented
certain facts to defendant concerning the loss. Id. at 356, 273 S.E.2d at 756-57. Plaintiff also alleged
that defendant failed to act expeditiously and in good faith and attempted to deprive plaintiff of the
benefits of his policy. Id. at 356-57, 273 S.E.2d at 757.
The court of appeals, quoting Newton, held that the materials submitted to the trial court were
insufficient to support a claim for punitive damages. Id. at 363, 273 S.E.2d at 760. The court stated
that defendant's denial of the claim, based on its belief after an investigation that plaintiff was in-
volved in starting the fire, did not indicate bad faith. Id. Although the claim was denied 19 months
after the fire, defendant's investigation continued until that time, and defendant based its denial on
the information gathered in the investigation. Id.; cf Murray v. Allstate Ins. Co., 51 N.C. App. 10,
18, 275 S.E.2d 195, 200 (1981) (plaintiffs did not allege that defendant's failure to repair property
was wanton, willful, or grossly negligent so as to establish a claim for punitive damages).
85. 57 N.C. App. 346, 291 S.E.2d 331 (1982).
86. Id., at 350, 291 S.E.2d at 333. For a discussion of the facts in Dailey, see infra note 90.
87. Dailey, 57 N.C. App. at 350, 291 S.E.2d at 333.
88. In the trial court Dailey received a judgment for compensatory damages in the amount of
$157,000 and punitive damages in the amount of $120,000, together with costs and prejudgment
interest. The trial court, however, entered a judgment non obstante veredicto for the defendant on
the issue of punitive damages. Dailey v. Integon Gen. Ins. Corp., 75 N.C. App. 387, 390, 331 S.E.2d
148, 151, disc rev. denied, 314 N.C. 664, 336 S.E.2d 399 (1985).
89. 75 N.C. App. 387, 331 S.E.2d 148, disc. rev. denied, 314 N.C. 664, 336 S.E.2d 399 (1985),
90. Id. at 394, 331 S.E.2d at 153. On July 25, 1980, plaintiff's house was rendered uninhabit-
able by fire. Id. at 391, 331 S.E.2d at 151-52. An investigation by the Fire Marshall determined that
the fire had been deliberately set, but plaintiff was cleared as a suspect. Id. at 391, 331 S.E.2d at 152.
In early August, Integon sent plaintiff a letter that erroneously included a waiver of rights form. Id.
Over the next several weeks, plaintiff sent defendant three different proof of loss forms. Integon
rejected the first two. Plaintiff mailed a third form to defendant, but it was neither returned nor
acted on for weeks. Id.
At the advice of one of Integon's adjustors, plaintiff obtained and submitted five cost estimates
for repairing the house, and plaintiff's wife prepared a detailed list of personal items damaged in the
fire. Id. Plaintiff's estimator's, a professional construction engineer and four licensed contractors,
believed that the house was rendered useless, and the cost of repairs would exceed the policy limits of
$105,000. Id.
The estimate Integon received was prepared by a carpenter, not licensed as a general contractor,
who testified that the house could be repaired for $48,286.83. Id. at 392, 331 S.E.2d at 152. Conse-
quently, on January 26, 1981, Integon offered to settle plaintiff's entire claim for $69,607.85. Id.
Some weeks after the fire, Integon engaged Mr. Charnock of INS Investigations to investigate
and determine whether plaintiff was involved in starting the fire. Id. Charnock spent three days
investigating the claim. He questioned 16 neighbors and the Fire Marshall. Id. Allegedly,
Charnock offered two people $10,000 if they would help establish that plaintiff had his house burned
down. Id. at 392-93, 331 S.E.2d at 152-53. At trial, Charnock denied these allegations and stated he
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tortious breach of contract accompanied by aggravated conduct.9 1 The court
emphasized that under some circumstances the law of North Carolina allows the
"recovery of punitive damages on claims for tortious, bad faith refusal to settle
under an insurance policy, even though... the refusal to settle is also a breach
of contract."192 Furthermore, the court rejected defendant's contention that a
"separate identifiable tort unrelated to the contract" was required. 93 Rather,
punitive damages are recoverable when there is an "identifiable" tort, even
though the tort also constitutes or accompanies a breach of contract.94 In Dai-
ley II the identifiable tort alleged by plaintiff-the insurer's bad faith refusal to
settle-not only accompanied the breach of contract, but also included aggra-
vated conduct.
95
Although decisions prior to Dailey II held that an insured had stated a valid
claim for special and punitive damages for an insurer's bad faith refusal to pay,
Dailey II was the first case to reinstate a punitive damages award against an
insurance company. The question arises to what extent the tort of bad faith will
influence insurance law in North Carolina. In addition, the question arises
whether extra-contract damages will be extended beyond the insurance context
and into the area of noninsurance commercial contracts.
Historically, North Carolina courts have taken a cautious approach to ex-
posing insurers to liabilities beyond those imposed by the insurance contract.
96
Because the courts recognize the financial impact of excess liability judgments,
there is concern that the cost of punitive damage awards against insurance com-
panies will be passed to consumers through higher insurance premiums.97 The
had told one person that there was a $10,000 reward for apprehending the arsonists. Ia at 393, 331
S.E.2d at 153.
Plaintiff's complaint set forth three claims against Integon. The first claim was for breach of
the insurance contract. Id. at 387, 331 S.E.2d at 150. The second claim was for Integon's bad faith
failure to pay its obligations and plaintiff's resulting embarassment, mental distress, and legal ex-
penses. Id. The third claim, also based on the insurer's bad faith refusal to settle, was for $200,000
in punitive damages. Id.
91. Id. at 398, 331 S.E.2d at 156. The court emphasized that the insurer's inadequate investiga-
tion of the claim, the inordinate delay of the unreasonable settlement, and the bad faith conduct of
Charnock clearly established that Integon had engaged in aggravated conduct toward the plaintiff.
Id. at 397, 331 S.E.2d at 155.
92. Id. at 395, 331 S.E.2d at 154; see Payne v. State Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 67 N.C. App.
692, 313 S.E.2d 912 (1984); Dailey I, 57 N.C. App. 346, 291 S.E.2d 331 (1982).
93. Dailey II, 75 N.C. App. at 395-96, 331 S.E.2d at 154.
94. Id. at 396, 331 S.E.2d at 154. The court's language in Dailey II reiterates North Carolina's
acceptance of tortious breach of contract. The court dispenses with the requirement that the plaintiff
prove a separate identifiable tort outside the contract. Rather, the insurer's tortious conduct accom-
panying the breach of contract allows for the recovery of extra-contract damages. Id.
Arguably, the court's emphasis on tortious conduct "accompanying" or "constituting" a breach
of contract somewhat blurs the distinction between tort and contract law. Although public policy
may demand tort damages in certain breach of contract actions, the parties' freedom to allocate risks
and expectations in a contract necessarily will be upset unless sound judicial reasoning controls
expansive tort remedies. To what extent public policy will require the expansion of tortious breach
of contract remains unclear. See infra notes 109-21 and accompanying text.
95. Dailey II, 75 N.C. App. at 396, 331 S.E.2d at 154.
96. See supra note 83 and accompanying text; see also Olive v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 76 N.C.
App. 180, 190, 333 S.E.2d 41, 46 (court will approach the issue of tortious breach of contract with
caution), disc, rev. denied, 314 N.C. 668, 336 S.E.2d 400 (1985).
97. See Newton, 291 N.C. at 116, 229 S.E.2d at 303. Insurance premiums also might increase
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inequality of bargaining power 98 between the insurer and the insured, and the
quasi-public nature99 of the insurance industry, however, have convinced North
Carolina courts to extend tort liability to insurers who have refused to deal fairly
with their insureds.
Arguably, application of a strict liability standard against insurers would
promote compliance with contractual duties and deter unfair claims prac-
tices.I10 North Carolina and other jurisdictions, however, have refused to im-
pose a strict liability standard on insurance companies. Thus, an honest mistake
or reasonable disagreement between the insurer and the insured will not consti-
tute bad faith per se. 1° 1 Moreover, even if an insurer does engage in wrongful
conduct, an insured will not recover punitive damages unless the insurer's con-
duct is accompanied by some element of aggravation.10
2
Although a variety of activities could constitute bad faith conduct by an
insurance company, two factors are often critical in the determination of bad
faith: (1) the sufficiency of the insurer's investigation of a claim, and (2) the
subsequent evaluation of the validity of the claim.' 0 3 Dailey 11 placed much
emphasis on the fact the insurance company's investigation of the insured's
claim was both delinquent and improper, and the resulting settlement offer was
grossly inadequate. 104
because insurers, faced with the threat of a punitive damages award for disputing a claim with their
insureds, may elect to settle frivolous and meritless insurance claims.
98. See supra notes 53-54 & 82 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 55-60 & 82 and accompanying text.
100. Comment, The Emerging Fiduciary Obligations and Strict Liability in Insurance Law, 14
CAL. W.L. REv. 358, 376-77 (1978). This student commentator argues that fiduciary duties should
be imposed on insurance companies, with a rule of strict liability against an insurer who harms the
insured by failing to pay a claim. Id. Under this standard the insured would be relieved of the
burden of proving bad faith conduct by the insurance company. Id. at 377.
101. See, eg., State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Clifton, 86 N.M. 757, 759, 527 P.2d 798, 800 (1974)
(citing Milledgeville Water Co. v. Fowler, 129 Ga. 111, 58 S.E. 643 (1907)) ("Mere delay or failure
of the insurer in making the repairs or disputing the extent of the insurer's obligation under its
contract does not give rise to a tort action."); Christian v. American Home Assur. Co., 577 P.2d 899,
905 (Okla. 1978) ("We recognize that there can be disagreement between insurer and insured on a
variety of matters .... Resort to a judicial forum is not per se bad faith or unfair dealing on the part
of the insurer regardless of the outcome of the suit.").
102. See supra notes 71-73 & 79 and accompanying text.
103. See Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 817, 620 P.2d 141, 144, 169 Cal.
Rptr. 691, 694 (1979), cert denied, 445 U.S. 912 (1980); Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis.
2d 675, 692, 271 N.W.2d 368, 377 (1978) (In applying the test to prove the tort of bad faith, it is
appropriate "to determine whether a claim was properly investigated and whether the results of the
investigation were subjected to a reasonable evaluation and review.").
North Carolina law defines an unfair business practice in connection with first-party and third-
party claims as the insurer's failure to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt
investigation of claims that arise under an insurance policy. See supra note 60.
104. Dailey II, 75 N.C. App. at 396-97, 331 S.E.2d at 155.
Commenting on the evidence, the court in Dailey II quoted the trial judge's appraisal of defend-
ant's conduct:
I would say to you in all candor that when this jury went out that I went and called my
insurance agent to check that my fire insurance wasn't with your client. There is no ques-
tion in my mind based on the evidence I heard that your client did not act in good faith in
settling this claim. I wouldn't any more let those two people in Goldsboro work on my
house, much less go inside my house than anything. I can understand why the jury would
feel the same way. The plaintiff on the one hand offered uncontested evidence from five
licensed contractors who build the majority of the homes apparently in the New Bern area
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If an investigation is purposeful and done in good faith, bad faith will not be
found even though a significant period of time elapses before the insurer acts on
the claim. 105 Moreover, as emphasized by one commentator, an insurer's failure
to properly investigate a claim generally will not subject it to liability unless the
failure causes harm to the insured. 10 6 Thus, if the insurer, aware of all the facts,
still would have denied the claim, then the insurer's failure to investigate will not
allow the insured to recover excess damages. 10 7 Similarly, if the insurance com-
pany has no legal duty to pay a claim, it is not important that the company or its
agents improperly investigated the claim.' 0 8
Notwithstanding the limitations of tortious breach of contract in the insur-
ance context, a recovery of extra-contract damages in certain noninsurance cases
would seem likely. Most courts, however, have been reluctant to extend the bad
faith tort beyond insurance contracts.10 9 These courts reason that parties
should have the right to bargain for their own benefit and should be given the
freedom to contract as they please."t 0 Moreover, when a breach of contract
as to the cost of repair and the only evidence really that you had was two people from
Goldsboro, a father and son team who were going to work at six percent profit and use
their profit-just give up their profit-to buy all the extra materials they would need; and
you know, I love American businessmen but I just never have met two quite as kind as
those people. It was just a little far fetched, you know, that legitimate licensed contractors
could be so far afield from these two people. I think your client in representing that those
two gentlemen from Goldsboro were competent in good faith to repair this home breached
a duty that they had to their policy holder; and, then they would come along with an
appraiser who testifies as to the personal property that every pair of shoes I have which is
over a year old has no cash value whatsoever and when that is coupled with an investigator
who comes down and tours the neighborhood and goes and talks to others and conducts
himself as the jury found he did then I think the evidence clearly supports the punitive
damage verdict if that verdict, if that issue, were properly to be submitted to the jury.
Id. at 397, 331 S.E.2d at 155-56.
105. See Shields v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 50 N.C. App. 355, 363, 273 S.E.2d 756, 760
(1981); cf Olive v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 76 N.C. App. 180, 190, 333 S.E.2d 41, 46 (when defendant
promptly denied plaintiff's insurance claim based on a reasonable interpretation of the policy, and
defendant's agents, in good faith, provided plaintiff with inaccurate information, plaintiff failed to
meet the minimum proof necessary to show tortious breach of contract), disc rev. denied, 314 N.C.
668, 336 S.E.2d 400 (1985); Beasley v. National Say. Life Ins. Co., 75 N.C. App. 104, 108, 330
S.E.2d 207, 209 (1985) (allegations that defendant insurer made false statements and misrepresenta-
tions of fact to the insured, without precise facts to support the allegations, did not constitute an
element of aggravation to justify punitive damages for breach of contract), disc. rev. denied, 316 N.C.
372, 373, 341 S.E.2d 338, 339 (1986) (per curiam) (The North Carolina Supreme Court granted
review in 314 N.C. 537, 335 S.E.2d 13 (1985), but after careful consideration concluded that discre-
tionary review was improvidently allowed.).




109. The distinguishing characteristics between insurance and non-insurance contracts, coupled
with the lack of any clear criteria in identifying the bad faith tort, makes the extension of the tort
into commercial contract cases difficult. Louderback, Standards for Limiting the Tort of Bad Faith
Breach of Contract, 16 U.S.F. L. REv. 187, 188 (1982).
110. In Bliss v. Southern Pac. Co., 212 Or. 634, 321 P.2d 324 (1958), the Oregon Supreme Court
expressed the rule as follows:
When two or more persons competent for that purpose, upon a sufficient considera-
tion, voluntarily agree to do or not to do a particular thing which may be lawfully done or
omitted, they should be held to the consequences of their bargain. It is elementary that
public policy requires that such contracts be held sacred and shall be enforced by the
courts of justice unless some other overpowering rule of public policy intervenes which
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occurs, most courts have found traditional contract remedies to be adequate to
compensate the aggrieved party. In certain instances, however, contracts involv-
ing a substantial public interest may lead to judicial intervention to compensate
for breaches which offend public policy.III
Relationships in some ordinary commercial contracts possess characteris-
tics similar to that of insurer and insured and deserve analagous treatment.
112
Several factors critical in insurance bad faith litigation should be present before
extra-contract damages are allowed for tortious breach of a noninsurance con-
tract. 113 First, the tort of bad faith should only be applied when one of the
parties to the contract is able to dictate the terms because of a superior bargain-
ing position. 114 Second, the motivation for entering into the contract should not
be for profit, but rather should be to obtain a necessary "service or product," or
to gain "financial security or peace of mind."1 15 Third, the relationship between
the parties should be "such that the weaker party places its trust and confidence
in the larger entity." 116 Fourth, the conduct of the breaching party must evince
an intent to interfere with or frustrate the weaker party's ability to enjoy the
benefits of the contract. 1 7 Last, traditional contract remedies should be inade-
quate to compensate the injured party.
1 18
Several commercial settings could satisfy the above requirements and sup-
port the imposition of tort liability for bad faith breach of contract. For exam-
ple, the tort of bad faith could be applied in the leasing and purchasing of
residential real property, 19 or in employment discharge cases that violate public
renders such agreement illegal or unenforceable. This rule imposes upon the court a duty
to give contracts of that character effect, especially when they have been acted upon by the
parties. Without such a rule the commerce of the world would soon lapse into a chaotic
state.
Id. at 646, 321 P.2d at 330.
111. See id. at 646, 321 P.2d at 330.
112. See Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 768-69, 686
P.2d 1158, 1166-67, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 362-63 (1984); Cleary v. American Airlines, Ill Cal. App.
3d 443, 453, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 729 (1980) (plaintiff who brought an action for wrongful discharge
from employment stated a cause of action for the tort of bad faith breach of contract); Wallis v.
Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 1119, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123, 129 (1984) (plaintiff's employment
contract with defendant shares the necessary similarities with an insurance contract).
113. See Louderback, supra note 109, at 220-23, 227 (discussing four factors); see also Wallis v.
Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 1118, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123, 129 (1984) (citing five factors).
114. Louderback, supra note 109, at 227; see also Wallis v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d
1109, 1118, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123, 129 (1984) ("the contract must be such that the parties are in
inherently unequal bargaining positions").
115. Louderback, supra note 109, at 227; see also Wallis v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d
1109, 1118, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123, 129 (1984) ("the motivation for entering the contract must be a non-
profit motivation, i.e. to secure peace of mind, security, future protection").
116. Louderback, supra note 109, at 227; see also Wallis v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d
1109, 1118, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123, 129 (1984) ("one party is especially vulnerable because of the type of
harm it may suffer and of necessity places trust in the other part to perform").
117. Louderback, supra note 109, at 227; see also Wallis v. Superior Court, 160 Cal, App. 3d
1109, 1118, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123, 129 (1984) (stronger party is aware of weaker party's vulnerability).
118. See Wallis v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 1118, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123, 129 (1984)
("ordinary contract damages are not adequate because (a) they do not require the party in the supe-
rior position to account for its actions, and (b) they do not make the inferior party 'whole' ").
119. North Carolina courts have recognized the public policy interest in providing purchasers of
residential dwellings with an implied warranty of habitability. See Hartley v. Ballou, 286 N.C. 51,
209 S.E.2d 776 (1974), in which the court stated the rule as follows:
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policy. 1 20 By applying the suggested criteria effectively, the courts can protect
the public interest in regulating the conduct of parties in certain types of con-
tracts, while preserving the parties' fundamental right of freedom to contract. 
12 1
The recent development of tortious breach of contract in North Carolina is
indicative of the growing trend in extending tort liability to contract breaches
that offend public policy. Recognizing the public interest in preventing deleteri-
ous conduct by first-party insurers, North Carolina courts have cautiously ex-
tended extra-contract liability to bad faith settlement practices that evince signs
of aggravated conduct. Although the courts have exercised a reasonable degree
of restraint, it is incumbent on the judiciary to carefully regulate expansive dam-
age recoveries in breach of contract actions. A fundamental precept of contract
law is that parties to an agreement should have the freedom to allocate benefits
and risks as they choose. A bargained-for contract provides parties with a sense
of certainty and security that is essential in day-to-day transactions. Thus, the
blurring of tort law and contract law must be limited by sound judicial reason-
ing. Unless recovery for tortious breach of contract is limited to contractual
relationships that involve an overriding public policy, the important conceptual
differences between tort and contract law will disappear.
CHRIS MICHAEL KALLIANOS
[I]n every contract for the sale of a recently completed dwelling, and in every contract for
the sale of a dwelling then under construction, the vendor, if he be in the business of
building such dwelling, shall be held to impliedly warrant to the initial vendee that ... the
dwelling, together with all its fixtures.... is sufficiently free from major structural defects
and is constructed in a workmanlike manner ....
Id. at 62, 209 S.E.2d at 783. The Residential Rental Agreements Act provides that a landlord shall
make repairs and keep the premises of the residential lessee in a habitable condition. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 42-42 (1984).
120. In Sides v. Duke Hospital, 74 N.C. App. 331, 328 S.E.2d 818 (1985), the North Carolina
Court of Appeals recognized that employment discharges that violate public policy could give rise to
a tort action for wrongful discharge, notwithstanding the well established terminable-at-will rule.
Id. at 342-43, 328 S.E.2d at 826-27. For a discussion of Sides, see Note, Sides v. Duke Hospital: A
Public Policy Exception to the Employment-At-Will Rule, 64 N.C.L. REv. 840 (1986).
121. See Louderback, supra note 109, at 227.
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